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SIMON THE CYRENIAN.

On him they laid the cross, that he might bear it after Jesus.—Luke xxiii. 26.

AMONG the minor characters of Scripture history, the individuals who appear only once upon the scene, to play their part and retire again into the obscurity from which they emerged, there are few more interesting than Simon the Cyrenian. His relationship to the Saviour was unique. He was the only human being who can be said to have shared the physical sufferings of Christ on the day of his death and to some extent even to have relieved them. Little he thought, as he turned his steps towards Jerusalem that morning, of the share he was to have in the world's greatest tragedy, of the work awaiting him by the way that was to inscribe his name on the page of history and earn the gratitude of generations yet unborn.

Christ, we know, had to walk from the Prætorium or Judgment Hall to Calvary, the place of execution. An old-standing prophecy was unconsciously fulfilled by the Jews when they led Jesus outside the city wall to crucify him. The bodies of the sacrifices, whose blood had been offered as a sin-offering, were burned without the camp. "Wherefore Jesus also," says the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews, "that he might sanctify his people with his own blood, suffered without the gate." (Heb. xiii. 12.) A procession was formed, having for its centre Jesus and possibly the two malefactors, guarded by a band of Roman soldiers, and accompanied by the priestly accusers who longed to have the satisfaction of seeing the sentence of death carried out on the victim of their

machinations. Jerusalem in the course of her chequered history had gazed on many a sad scene, but upon none as sad as this.

It was part of the law that a criminal condemned to death should carry the cross on his own shoulders to the place of execution, as a public example which might deter others from committing the same or similar crimes. It was the attempt to put into force this part of the regulations which cast a side-light upon the degree of physical suffering our Saviour had to bear, and upon the degradation of his death.

On the previous evening Christ had endured the agony of the Garden, and the shame of betrayal by a disciple and of arrest by an armed band; and he had passed a sleepless night. He had been hurried from one place and from one tribunal to another,—from Annas to Caiaphas, from Caiaphas to Pilate, from Pilate to Herod, and from Herod back to Pilate. He had been falsely accused and cruelly treated—buffeted, mocked, and scourged. The painters who have represented him as tottering with weakness to the ground under the weight of the heavy cross laid upon him, have had no great demand to make on their or our imaginations.

It was presumably by the hands of the soldiers that the cross was placed on Christ, but the idea of relieving him of the burden and enabling themselves to carry out their orders without delay by carrying it themselves—easy as it would have been for a number of such men as they were to do so,—probably did not even suggest itself to their minds. We think of the death of Christ as similar to the extreme punishment inflicted by our own laws for capital crimes, but in reality it was even worse. There were attached to it a shame and a degradation of which we, living in a happier age, have little or no conception. Death by crucifixion marked a man not only as a felon but as a slave; it was a death no Roman citizen, however guilty or depraved, was allowed to die. "An instrument of the tortures which were inflicted only on slaves and strangers," says Gibbon, "became an object of horror in the eyes of a Roman citizen; and the ideas of guilt, of pain, and of ignominy were closely united with the idea of the cross." These men who surrounded Christ,—men who had already displayed their brutality by their treatment of him,—were ready to steep their hands in the blood of helpless women and innocent children, but they spurned the very thought of defiling themselves by carrying the cross of Christ.

Still, they did not wish to see their charge die by the way, for their orders were to crucify him. Nor did they care to see him

fainting under his load and delaying their morning's work; it was a busy time in Jerusalem and they had probably other work in hand. They must stretch a point to enable the condemned to keep pace with the executors.

The procession, passing out of the city, met Simon as he was entering it, and the soldiers impressed him into their service and laid upon him the cross of Christ. All that we are explicitly told of Simon by Luke is that he was a Cyrenian. Cyrene was a Greek colony in Libya, on the north coast of Africa, and is known to have been the seat of a Jewish synagogue. Simon may have been a Jew who had been living abroad in Cyrene, and who had now returned to Jerusalem, probably for the purpose of observing the Passover; or he may have been an African of Cyrene, who had perhaps been converted from heathenism to the Jewish faith through the Jews who had settled in his native place. As far as we can judge from the slender material furnished by the narrative, the latter seems to be the likelier supposition—that by Cyrenian, at least, we are to understand a native of Cyrene, an African. It does seem strange, when we think of it, that the man who was privileged to ease the Saviour's load was not one of the chosen Twelve, possibly not even one of the chosen people, but a stranger from the coast of Africa. How gladly, one would have thought, the stalwart Peter would have lent his aid. The question thus naturally arises—Why was he selected? Men were surely plentiful enough—men as strong as he, men whom the soldiers could just as easily have constrained to undertake the task. It may have been some sign of sympathy for the sufferer, shown by Simon alone in all the crowd, that led to his being chosen. We do not read that he made any protest, or objected to doing what any one except a friend of Jesus or one whose heart was naturally compassionate would have regarded as a troublesome and unpleasant task. The fact that he was 'compelled', according to Mark, may simply mean that his permission was not asked. Certainly we have no grounds for believing that Simon was actuated by any feeling of enmity towards Jesus; the presumption is all the other way—that while other bystanders either took an actual pleasure in seeing the sufferings of their victim aggravated, or looked on in apathetic indifference in a matter which was no concern of theirs, he showed himself to be at least not unwilling to relieve for a brief space of time one who had already suffered much and was still to suffer more.

Much as we should like to know something certain of the subse-

quent history of the man whose one appearance in the narrative is of such peculiar interest, we have to confess that we have nothing but tradition and conjecture to satisfy our natural curiosity. Mark describes him as "the father of Alexander and Rufus," which would seem to indicate that Simon's two sons at least were Christians, and well known to the early Christians for whom the Gospel of Mark was chiefly written. The only other place in the New Testament where the name Rufus occurs is in Romans xvi. 3,—"Salute Rufus, chosen in the Lord, and his mother and mine." If this Rufus is the same as the one mentioned by Mark,—which is just possible,—then Simon's wife also was eminent among the early Christians of her day and had played a mother's part to the great Apostle. There is a tradition, but only a tradition, that Simon as he bore the cross of Christ from the city gate to Calvary, continued to bear it as a faithful follower of the Master he had there served in his hour of need, to the end of his life. We need not wonder if the tradition should prove to be true. He cannot but have been impressed with the spirit of one whom he saw being led as a lamb to the slaughter, and none of the memorable words that fell from his lips would escape him. We read of the remarkable and powerful effect which the sight of the suffering and dying Christ had upon some who witnessed it—how the women of Jerusalem wept for him as he was being led through their streets,—how the dying thief appealed to him as his Lord, who, though dying a felon's death, was entering a kingdom,—how it led the Roman centurion to cry out, "Truly this was the Son of God,"—how it compelled Joseph and Nicodemus, secret believers before for fear of the Jews, to come forward openly to claim and to reverence the dead body of their Lord. Surely it is easy to believe that the man who was brought into such an intimate and touching fellowship with the Man of Sorrows in the hours of his supreme agony found healing in his stripes, and life through his death.

But while we very soon come to the end of the slender material that is available for shedding light on Simon's character and history, our interest in the incident in which he figures is by no means then exhausted. The picture which conveys to us all the certain knowledge we possess regarding him is a peculiarly suggestive one. If an artist wished to present to us in allegorical form the summons of Christ—"Take up thy cross, and follow me,"—where could he find a scene more suitable to his purpose, more likely to illuminate his subject and move all who gazed upon it to a heartfelt apprecia-

tion of his meaning, than here? Simon *literally* took up the cross of Christ, and followed him, and all the circumstances and surroundings were such as to bring home to us the religious significance of the words of which his act so vividly reminds us. Not from any previous design on his own part but in obedience to the command of a higher power, not for any selfish gain but simply to ease the sufferings of another, he bore the emblem of our Saviour's sorrows and followed in his steps. To those who are still outside the visible Church of Christ the story of Simon may present the call of Christ in a light they have not yet considered. It reminds us that he calls us to "the fellowship of his sufferings," as well as to "the power of his resurrection;" that the election of grace is an election to sacrifice as well as to privilege. In the vision in which God spoke to Ananias he described Paul as "a chosen vessel unto me . . . . . for I will show him how many things he must suffer for my name's sake." The terms Christ used in addressing his own disciples were such as would always impress this truth upon them—that they were called and set apart for the good of others. They were to be the salt of the earth, sweetening life and preserving it from corruption; to be a light, set on a candlestick, to gladden all who entered the house; a city set on a hill, a safe refuge in days of danger, and at all time by its very existence giving a sense of security to the dwellers in the adjoining valleys.

From the account of Paul's conversion to Christianity it is clear that the new life came to him above all as a new responsibility. It was a call to service, to a life of willing sacrifice—the main question with him thenceforth must be, what God had for him to do. And all through his epistles we know how this aspect of the Christian life is set before us. The Christian is a soldier, bound to obey; nay, more, he is a slave, not his own but bought with a price, branded on his body with the marks of his Lord, whose he is, and whom he must serve.

Let us not forget the all-important truth that we come to Christ as sinners to a Saviour, that we come to him for forgiveness and for cleansing, for the new birth and the renewed nature. But let us also remember that the pardon of sin and regeneration are after all but a means to an end—to fit us for God's service in the Kingdom of His Son, to enable us to live for the glory of God.

Then for all of us who profess to be followers of Christ, and members of his visible Church, it is well that we should from time to time ask ourselves how far our own lives are conforming to the

Scriptural standard of Christianity. Are we among those who gladly followed Christ from village to village, rejoicing in the gracious words that fell from his lips and in the wonderful works of God performed by him on the sick and blind and lame, with joy hearing him declared the well-beloved Son of God and sharing with him the glory of the Mount, joining heart and voice with those who hailed him as triumphant when he entered Jerusalem, but who forsook him and fled when the hour of trial came? Too often in the history of the Church called by his name have the professed followers of Christ shrunk back from his cross and left it for strangers to carry. The sacrifice demanded

> "For the cause that lacks assistance
> For the wrong that needs resistance,"

has often indeed been made all the more severe from the want of Christian sympathy, the indifference, and even the opposition of those who ought to have been the leaders of Christian effort.

There is, it is true, no merit in gratuitous suffering, and it is a sign of weakness to seek sacrifice for its own sake; but any Christian whose effort to follow Christ involves no cross, who never finds duty difficult or the temptation to shirk it hard to resist, who has never been the poorer in money or in reputation for the sake of his principles, may well question if he has really striven to conform his life to the pattern set by Christ. Paul, writing to the Colossians, speaks of "filling up that which is behind of the afflictions of Christ, in my flesh, for his body's sake, which is the Church." Paul cannot mean—he would have repudiated the idea,—that *our* sufferings can possibly add to the vicarious merit of those of Christ, or that there was anything left incomplete in our Saviour's redeeming work that we could in any way supplement; but he does mean that as long as the work of Christ in this world remains to be done, so long the sufferings of Christ must in some measure be endured. Christ sacrificed himself for us not only on the cross but all through his life; he suffered not only for us but with us, in taking upon himself the burden of our humanity that he might redeem us from its curse. If we, one with him by faith, are to share his victorious life,—and that is the prerogative of every Christian,—we must follow in the path he trod, not seeking to please ourselves but him, not doing our own will, but God's, not demanding to be served, but serving others. The travail of the soul of Christ as he looks down upon the cruelty and oppression, the injustice and heartlessness of men, must be shared by us if we are to share with him the glory

of redeeming the world for God. Such high and holy work is not to be done without sacrifice; the *via lucis* is the *via crucis*. And while we are redeemed by the cross in order to bear the cross, the cross we bear becomes again a means of our sanctification. To be under the cross is to be near the captain of our salvation, who can make us, as he was himself made, "perfect through sufferings." (Heb. ii. 10.)

Two considerations may, in conclusion, be offered for the consideration of any of our readers who have not yet definitely given themselves to the service of Christ and taken his yoke upon them.

The first is that in rejecting Christ we do not evade the cross. The choice lies not between a cross and no cross, but between the cross of Christ and a Christless cross—the cross of disappointment, devoid of divine sympathy, the cross of regret for opportunities misspent, for energies dissipated, for life wasted. Bitterest of all must be the cross of remorse borne by those who after a life of selfish and sinful pleasure are forced to say,—

> "My days are in the yellow leaf;
> The flowers and fruit of love are gone;
> The worm, the canker, and the grief
> Are mine alone!"

The reproach of Christ is greater riches than the treasures of Egypt.

And as it is by the yoke of Christ—the yoke that is so often the symbol of servitude—that we find rest to our souls, so his cross instead of bearing us down as an oppressive burden will lift us up and make us stand erect and free. It were an easy task to find abundant proof of the truth of this from the rich stores of Christian experience as well as from the word of God, but we may rest content with the beautiful saying of one to whom the cross of Christ was more than a religious expression, to whom it meant separation, for a time at least, from all that he held dear on earth, and yet to whom that cross was so dear that he was half jealous of it, fearing that he should begin to love it with something like the love he owed his Lord alone. "Take that crabbed tree—the cross of Christ—upon you," said the Scottish saint Samuel Rutherford, and you will find it a burden,—such a "burden as sails are unto a ship or as wings are unto a bird."

James M. Macphail.

ROBERT BROWNING AS A REPRESENTATIVE VICTORIAN POET*:—II.

We must now turn to another feature of Browning's poetry. Browning feels a passionate interest in the story of a soul. As a result of his love of realism, we find that his poems are dramatic, giving utterance to the thoughts and feelings of others as they themselves would have done, or as he puts it in *Sordello*,

> "By making speak, myself kept out of view,
> The very man, as he was wont to do."

His aim is to show how each soul conceives of itself and exhibits its vital essence. Thought plays therefore in his drama a much larger part than in the writings of other poets; and action is valued only as revealing thought or motive. As he writes in *Luria*,

> "To the motive, the endeavour, the heart's self
> His quick sense looks; he crowns and calls aright
> The soul of the purpose, ere it is shaped as act,
> Takes flesh in the world and clothes itself a king."

Browning's drama is not the drama of visible or outward events; it is the drama of the interior, where the soul is the centre of action. It is of a new form, which has, in the words of Mrs. Browning in her *Aurora Leigh*, outgrown

> "The simulation of the painted scene,
> Boards, actors, prompters, gas light and costume,
> And taken for a nobler stage the soul itself,
> Its shifting fancies and celestial lights,
> With all its orchestral silences,
> To keep the pauses of the rhythmic sounds."

In Browning's plays we watch the workings of the mental machinery; we see its peculiarities of structure, its individual characters, and the interaction of its parts. His characters explain themselves by their own speech. While the drama of action demands several individuals for the grouping of events so as to produce the intended crisis, the drama of the soul's working, the introspective drama, where the individual reveals himself, evolves the crisis in monologues. This is Browning's characteristic method. He reveals the development of the soul in the form of monologue, which appears in his earliest poem and which he has developed and

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* A lecture delivered in the College Hall, Trivandrum.

employed more skilfully and consistently than any other writer. Original as the topic and his manner and form of treatment were, his style, too, was original. It moved to the throbbing of an inner organism, disregarding external surroundings.

> "I felt
> My heart's life throbbing in my verse to show
> It lived."

Browning's poetry is vital, is powerfully alive. It is to this vitality, this originality in topic and manner, form and style, that the oft-repeated charge of obscurity brought against Browning is to be attributed. But is he really obscure or unintelligible? His poems may not be, and several of them are not, easy reading, but are they not lucid? "To call any of these plays unintelligible is," says Mr. Augustine Birrell, "ridiculous; nobody who has ever read them ever did, and why people who have not read them should abuse them is hard to see. Were society put upon its oath, we should be surprised to find how many people in high places have not read *All's Well that Ends Well*, or *Timon of Athens*, but they don't go about saying these plays are unintelligible. Like wise folk they pretend to have read them and say nothing. In Browning's case they are spared the hypocrisy. No one need pretend to have read *A Soul's Tragedy*, and it seems therefore inexcusable for any one to assert that one of the plainest, most pointed, and piquant bits of writing in the language is unintelligible." It is true that *Sordello* and *Prince Hohenstiel Schwangau* are difficult, and so is *Fifine at the Fair* and *Asolando* in parts, and *Aristophanes' Apology*, from its unfamiliar allusions. A few of the smaller poems, specially complex in psychological analysis, are also difficult, and these are about all to which the tern 'unintelligible' can with any show of reason be applied. "In the 21,116 lines which form Browning's longest work and masterpiece, the psychological epic of the *Ring and the Book*," writes Mr. Symons, "I incline to think it very possible that a careful scrutiny might reveal 116 which an ordinary reader would require to read twice. Anything more clear than the work as a whole, it would be difficult to find. It is much easier to follow than *Paradise Lost*." Those who mistake "pleasure for the final cause of poetry or leisure for the hour of the poet" cannot certainly enjoy their Browning, and the reason of it will be clear from the following passage in which Swinburne triumphantly vindicates our author from this very charge of obscurity. "If there is any great quality more perceptible than another in Mr. Browning's

intellect, it is his decisive and incisive faculty of thought, his sureness and intensity of perception, his rapid and trenchant resolution of aim. To charge him with obscurity is about as accurate as to call Lynceus purblind or complain of the sluggish action of the telegraphic wire. He is something too much the reverse of obscure, he is too brilliant and subtle for the ready reader of a ready writer to follow with any certainty the track of an intelligence which moves with such incessant rapidity, or even to realize with what spider-like swiftness and sagacity his building spirit leaps and lightens to and fro, backward and forward, as it lives along the animated line of its labour, springs from thread to thread, and darts from centre to circumference of the glittering and quivering web of living thought woven from the inexhaustible stores of his perceptions, and kindled from the inexhaustible fire of his imagination. He never thinks but at full speed; and the rate of his thought is to that of another man's as the speed of a railway to that of a waggon, or the speed of a telegraph to that of a railway." As a specimen of Browning's dramatic spirit, we may refer to the scene between Ottima and Sebald, in which, perhaps, is reached the highest level of tragic utterance attained in modern dramatic poetry.

Ottima. "Buried in woods we lay, you recollect;
Swift ran the searching tempest overhead;
And ever and anon some bright white shaft
Burned thro' the pine-tree roof, here burned and there,
As if God's messenger thro' the close wood screen
Plunged and replunged his weapon at a venture,
Feeling for guilty thee and me: then broke
The thunder like a whole sea overhead—

Sebald. Yes!

Ottima. —While I stretched myself upon you, hands
To hands, my mouth to your hot mouth, and shook
All my locks loose, and covered you with them—
You, Sebald, the same you!

Sebald. Slower, Ottima!

Ottima. And as we lay—

Sebald. Less vehemently! Love me!
Forgive me! Take not words, mere words to heart!
Your breath is worse than wine! Breathe slow, speak slow
Do not lean on me!

Ottima. Sebald, as we lay,
Rising and falling only with our pants,
Who said, 'Let death come now! 'Tis right to die!
'Right to be punished! Nought completes such bliss
'But woe!' Who said that?

Sebald. How did we ever rise?
Was't that we slept? Why did it end?
Ottima. I felt you
Taper into a point the ruffled ends
Of my loose locks 'twixt both your humid lips.
My hair is fallen now: knot it again!
Sebald. I kiss you now, dear Ottima, now and now!
This way? Will you forgive me—be once more
My great queen?
Ottima. Bind it thrice about my brow;
Crown me your queen, your spirit's arbitress,
Magnificent in sin. Say that!
Sebald. I crown you
My great white queen, my spirit's arbitress,
Magnificent

[*From without is heard the voice of Pippa singing.*

The year's at the spring
And day's at the morn;
Morning's at seven;
The hill-side's dew-pearled!
The lark's on the wing;
The snail's on the thorn:
God's in his heaven—
All's right with the world!

[*Pippa passes.*

Sebald. God's in his heaven! Do you hear that? Who spoke?
You, you spoke!
Ottima. Oh—that little ragged girl!
She must have rested on the step: we give them
But this one holiday the whole year round.
Did you ever see our silk-mills—their inside?
There are ten silk-mills now belong to you.
She stoops to pick my double heartsease
Sh!
She does not hear: call you out louder!
Sebald. Leave me!
Go, get your clothes on—dress those shoulders!
Ottima. Sebald?
Sebald. Wipe off that paint! I hate you.
Ottima. Miserable!
Sebald. My God, and she is emptied of it now!
Outright now!—how miraculously gone
All of the grace—had she not strange grace once?
Why, the blank cheek hangs listless as it likes,
No purpose holds the features up together,
Only the cloven brow and puckered chin
Stay in their places: and the very hair,
That seemed to have a sort of life in it,

Drops, a dead web!
Ottima. Speak to me—not of me!
Sebald. That round great full-orbed face, where not an angle
Broke the delicious indolence—all broken!
Ottima. To me—not of me! Ungrateful, perjured cheat!
A coward too; but ingrate's worse than all.
Beggar—my slave——a fawning, cringing lie!
Leave me! Betray me! I can see your drift!
A lie that walks and eats and drinks!
Sebald. My God!
Those morbid olive faultless shoulder-blades—
I should have known there was no blood beneath!
Ottima. You hate me, then? You hate me, then?
Sebald. To think
She would succeed in her absurd attempt,
And fascinate by sinning, show herself
Superior——guilt from its excess superior
To innocence! That little peasant's voice
Has righted all again. Though I be lost,
I know which is the better, never fear,
Of vice or virtue, purity or lust,
Nature or trick! I see what I have done,
Entirely now! Oh, I am proud to feel
Such torments—let the world take credit thence—
I, having done my deed, pay too its price!
I hate, hate, curse you! God's in his heaven!
Ottima. —Me!
Me! no, no, Sebald, not yourself—kill me!
Mine is the whole crime. Do but kill me—then
Yourself—then—presently—first hear me speak!
I always meant to kill myself—wait, you!
Lean on my breast—not as a breast; don't love me
The more because you lean on me, my own
Heart's Sebald! There, there, both deaths presently!
Sebald. My brain is drowned now—quite drowned: all I feel
Is . . . is, at swift-recurring intervals,
A hurry-down within me, as of waters
Loosened to smother up some ghastly pit:
There they go—whirls from a black fiery sea!
Ottima. Not me—to him, O God, be merciful!"

I must now refer to another great movement of the Victorian age which is very largely reflected in Browning's writings—I mean the scientific movement. In the early days of the movement it was feared that the spirit of investigation, however conducive to the growth of knowledge, would prove antagonistic to the development of poetry. Edgar Allan Poe in a sonnet that he wrote pathetically asked of science,

> "Why preyest thou thus upon the poet's heart,
> Vulture, whose wings are dull realities?
> How should he love thee? or how deem thee wise,
> Who wouldst not leave him in his wandering
> To seek for treasure in the jewelled skies,
> Albeit he soared with an undaunted wing?"

He failed to see that science is

> "But an exchange of ignorance for that
> Which is another kind of ignorance,"

and that it only enhances the mystery upon which poetry subsists. There would be little difficulty in showing from Browning how details of the most unexpected kind, from several branches of science, have passed into verse; but this is only of subordinate significance. The influence of the scientific spirit is manifest in one of the earliest of Browning's poems, where in certain respects he has anticipated later scientific conclusions. But for the spirit of science *Paracelsus* would have been impossible. In it we find the most lucid poetical enunciation of the idea of evolution. Seldom has the idea received a more satisfactory expression than in the close of *Paracelsus*. The great man of science of the middle ages begins by showing how God is immanent in everything, and how everything leads up to man.

> "Thus He dwells in all,
> From life's minute beginnings, up at last
> To man—the consummation of this scheme
> Of being, the completion of this sphere
> Of life: whose attributes had here and there
> Been scattered o'er the visible world before,
> Asking to be combined, dim fragments meant
> To be united in some wondrous whole,
> Imperfect qualities throughout creation,
> Suggesting some one creature yet to make,
> Some point where all those scattered rays should meet
> Convergent in the faculties of man.
>
> ....
> ....progress is
> The law of life, man is not Man as yet.
> Nor shall I deem his object served, his end
> Attained, his genuine strength put fairly forth,
> While only here and there a star dispels
> The darkness, here and there a towering mind
> O'erlooks its prostrate fellows: when the host
> Is out at once to the despair of night,
> When all mankind alike is perfected,

Equal in full-blown powers—then, not till then,
I say, begins man's general infancy.

....

When all the race is perfected alike
As man, that is; all tended to mankind,
And man produced, all has its end thus far:
But in completed man begins anew
A tendency to God."

In Browning's view evolution prevails through the entire range of existence. This is not merely a youthful fancy. It is repeated in *Prince Hohenstiel Schwangau.*

" I like the thought He should have lodged me once
I' the hole, the cave, the hut, the tenement,
The mansion and the palace; made me learn
The feel o' the first, before I found myself
Loftier i'the last, not more emancipate;
From first to last of lodging, I was I,
And not at all the place that harboured me.
Do I refuse to follow farther yet
I' the backwardness, repine if tree and flower,
Mountain or streamlet were my dwelling-place
Before I gained enlargement, grew mollusc?
As well account that way for many a thrill
Of kinship, I confess to, with the powers
Called Nature: animate, inanimate,
In parts or in the whole, there is something there
Man-like that somehow meets the man in me."

But Browning goes farther than the man of science in his exposition of this grand idea. There is a moral background in Browning's conception. Evolution according to him finds its explanation in a Creator. Though the principle of evolution explains the diversity in life, it fails to explain the origin of life. Protoplasm must depend on something beyond it for its vitality. By means of evolution Browning explains all anomalies that are inconsistent with the conception of a moral government of the universe. In the light of this principle evil loses its significance. In the following passage from *Ferishtah's Fancies,* the explanation of physical pain as the source from which love and sympathy are evolved, is given.

" Put pain from out the world, what room were left
For thanks to God, for love to man? Why thanks,—
Except for some escape, whate'er the style,
From pain that might be, name it as thou mayst?
Why love,—when all thy kind, save me, suppose,

Thy father, and thy son, and . . . well, thy dog,
To eke the decent number out—we few
Who happen—like a handful of chance stars
From the unnumbered host—to shine o'erhead
And lend thee light,—our twinkle all thy store,—
We only take thy love! Mankind, forsooth?
Who sympathizes with their general joy
Foolish as undeserved? But pain—see God's
Wisdom at work! Man's heart is made to judge
Pain deserved nowhere by the common flesh
Our birthright,—bad and good deserve alike
No pain, to human apprehension! Lust,
Greed, cruelty, injustice, crave (we hold)
Due punishment from somebody, no doubt:
But ulcer in the midriff! that brings flesh
Triumphant from the bar whereto arraigned
Soul quakes with reason."

Evolution besides explaining physical pain also explains moral evil. Resistance is indispensable for progress, and for spiritual progress the existence of moral evil is necessary. So early as in *Sordello,* Browning expresses the idea that evil is the scheme by which through ignorance good labours to exist. It is an idea that occurs again and again in his writings. In *Abt Vogler,* the richest, deepest, and fullest poem on music in the language, he writes:—

"There shall never be one lost good! What was, shall live as before;
The evil is null, is nought, is silence implying sound;
What was good shall be good, with for evil, so much good more;
On the earth the broken arcs; in the heaven, a perfect round."

Life would not be worth living if there were no conflict. In *Rephan,* where all alike are in "neutral best," life is stagnation, for "what is come to perfection perishes," but on earth

"Poor vaunt of life indeed
Were man but formed to feed
On joy, to solely seek and find and feast.
Such feasting ended, then
As sure an end to men.
Irks care the crop-full bird? Frets doubt the maw-crammed beast?

Without conflict, the brute alone will remain, the man, the possible God will vanish. To save us from sinking to brute level we are endowed with elements that rouse soul-powers and call for strenuous effort. All rebuffs and stings of the world should be welcomed as impulses to higher progress. Even our failures have their moral value. "What is our failure here but a triumph's

evidence for the fulness of the days?" "We fall to rise, are baffled to fight better, sleep to wake." Life, therefore, shall succeed in that it seems to fail. Fight on, if you desire to increase in moral strength.

"A man's reach should exceed his grasp,
Or what is a heaven for?"

Even temptation is a blessing for those who can withstand it. As the Pope says,

"Why comes temptation but for man to meet
And master and make crouch beneath his foot,
And to stand pedestaled in triumph? Pray
'Lead us into no such temptations, Lord!'
Yea, but, O Thou whose servants are the bold,
Lead such temptations by the head and hair,
Reluctant dragons, up to who dares fight,
That so he may do battle and have praise!"

It is Browning's faith in evolution that gives him his manly optimism. We all know how gloomy life appeared to Byron, even at the age of seventeen. Here is what Browning wrote at seventy.

"Have you found your life distasteful?
My life did and does smell sweet.
Was your youth of pleasure wasteful?
Mine I saved and hold complete.
Do your joys with age diminish?
When mine fail me, I'll complain.
Must in death your daylight finish?
My sun sets to rise again!
I find earth not gray but rosy;
Heaven not grim, but fair of hue.
Do I stoop? I pluck a posy;
Do I stand and stare? All is blue."

His optimism is the result of a firm conviction expressed in the magical lines of little Pippa,

"God's in his heaven,
All's right with the world."

For, as he has elsewhere said,

"God! Thou art love! I build my faith on that."

It is his hope that however thick the cloud stretched over the world, it will be pierced by sunshine and love, for

"What began best can't end worst,
Nor what God blessed once, prove accurst."

Listen to what he writes in *Aristophanes' Apology*:

> " O nothing doubt, Philemon ! Greed and strife,
> Hatred and cark and care, what place have they
> In yon blue liberality of heaven?
> ....
> Heaven, earth, and sea, my warrant—in their name
> Believe—o'er falsehood, truth is surely sphered,
> O'er ugliness beams beauty."

Such is Browning's message to an age of doubt and despondency; a message that cannot be better summed up than in the following words of Dean Farrar :—" If then I might venture to try to sum up in a sentence the main lessons of Robert Browning's life and poetry, it would be somewhat thus : Live out truly, nobly, bravely, wisely, happily, your human life ; not as a supernatural life, for you are a man, not an angel ; not as a sensual life, for you are a man, not a demon ; not as a frivolous life, for you are a man and not an insect. Live each day the true life of a man to-day ; not yesterday's life only lest you should become a murmurer ; not to-morrow's life only lest you become a visionary ; but the life of happy yesterday's and confident to-morrows—the life of to-day unwounded by the Parthian arrows of yesterday and undarkened by the possible cloudland of to-morrow. Life is indeed a mystery ; but it was God who gave it in a world wrapped round with sweet air, and bathed in sunshine, and abounding with knowledge ; and a ray of eternal light falls upon it even here, and that light shall wholly transfigure it beyond the grave."

K. G. Sesha Aiyar.

THE FOUNDATION OF MORALS :—IV.*

If utilitarianism is unphilosophic in its way of providing a sanction for morality, and furnishes a criterion which ill defines the province and scope of morals, it is because it represents but " the initial stage of moral science." The generalizations of utilitarianism have been made from an imperfect view of human nature, and from an observation of the rough moral experience of mankind. The direct extension of this theory on a broader and more rational basis results in the rational utilitarianism of Mr. Spencer. The maxim of rational

* A lecture delivered in the College Hall, Trivandrum.

conduct is still the same: seek pleasure and avert pain. Mr. Spencer at the outset puts the most vital question, Is life worth living?; and in the answers to it finds justification for his fundamental assumption, that pleasure is the only rational end of life. Life is or is not worth living to the common man, according as it yields an excess of pleasure or an excess of pain. Even under the extreme views of optimists and pessimists the common assumption lies, that pleasure is the *summum bonum* of existence. Mr. Spencer then concludes that "pleasure, somewhere, at some time, to some being, is an inexpugnable element in the conception of moral life." If this be the ultimate view of life, optimism and pessimism being subjective and individualistic, it would be only right for an individual who believes, and rightly perhaps, that he is plunged in extreme wretchedness, without hope of redemption, to seek his salvation by the heroism of suicide, and charitable indeed for one who cannot do better, to help him who is of weak nerve in this meritorious act of deliverance. Was not the civilized man of historic times right in extending the treatment to his old parents and weak children which is given by the civilized man of our time to his old dogs and horses? The whole civilized world, however, regards it as inhuman to put an end to any human life unless it has proved to be positively, injurious or prospectively dangerous to other more precious human lives. Society and government regard human life as sacred, and punish all violence done to it; irrespective of the happiness or misery of the individual. It may not be inconsistent with the pessimistic or optimistic view of life to hold that life should be lived for its own sake and go out as naturally as it came into being. But to many minds such expressions as life for its own sake, knowledge for its own sake, are quite unintelligible, because tautological. When, however, it is seen that they mean nothing more than that intellectual life, moral life, and even life in general, are ultimate ends in themselves, requiring no further justification for their being regarded as such, half the perplexity is removed. Yet it is difficult to convince a man that some kind of happiness, individual or social, accompanying all actions conducive to life, physical, intellectual, and moral, is not the end of conduct, as it has become a natural motive with him. I believe Mr. Spencer himself falls into the mistake of supposing that what is a natural, and to some extent, necessary motive to moral conduct is itself the end of nature. This error corrected, which can be done without subverting his system, evolutional ethics, it seems to me, is the most acceptable.

The science of moral conduct has for its object, as Mr. Spencer expresses it, "to determine how and why certain modes of conduct are detrimental and certain others beneficial. The business of moral science is to deduce from the laws of life and the conditions of existence what kinds of action necessarily tend to produce happiness, and what kinds to produce unhappiness. The deductions, when made, should be recognised as laws of conduct to be conformed to irrespective of a direct estimation of happiness or misery." Certainly this is an advance on the utilitarian view of morality with its purely empirical results which have to be rationalized Let us follow Mr. Spencer in his task of grounding utilitarian morals in the general laws of life. If we would trace the lines on which evolution has marched, since the beginning of life, till it has planted its flag in the centre of our civilization, we should find a steady and progressive adjustment of acts to environment, and with this a progressive perfection and completion of life. At the initial stage of evolution, individual lives were extremely precarious and uncertain on account of their incapacity to adjust themselves to their surroundings, and because of their failure to preserve their moving equilibrium. With the addition of new organs, and the improvement and refinement of the old as well as the new, and with the proper balancing of functions, life gathered strength and its duration was prolonged, until at last in man, who is endowed with special faculties of insight and foresight, self-maintaining conduct became comparatively perfect. But the development has not been wholly one-sided; for alongside of the progressive adaptation of conduct to the end of self-preservation there has been almost from the beginning a progressive adjustment of conduct to the end of racial preservation. As the individual became more and more fitted to live in the struggle for existence, it became also the better able to rear its offspring and afford them every protection until they could hold their own and run the race of life independently. This, then, is the form, and this the direction in which altruism first manifested itself. In the brute, the altruistic side is not so well developed as the egoistic, as conduct is prompted by instinctive appetites and cravings. In self-conscious man, altruism in this form at least is fully developed, so that there is some truth in the saying that parents live only for their children. Every man seems to live for himself, but in reality no man lives solely for himself. When the individual learns to adjust his conduct to the ends of self-preservation and racial preservation without

trampling on the rights of others, and when he without detriment to such functions which have become almost natural, acquires the power to help others in the fulfilment of the same, and actually does help them, he moves on the truly moral plane. In an established order of society, no individual dare tamper with the rights of others in order to secure his own interests; and the man who simply abstains from wrongs affecting others, moves therefore on a lower ethical level. Certainly there are many in whom the narrow altruism confined to the family gives place to a much wider altruism which tends to the heightening of, life generally: the manifestation of the all-preserving impulse is but the natural extension of the genuine altruism that swells the individual's heart in family relations. From a comparative study of life from the merely animal to the ethical level, we are able to trace the lines on which progress has so far been made, and has yet to be made, and to define the moral ideal in process of realization, which it is our duty to strive to realize. The acts adjusted to ends, says Mr. Spencer, "tend finally to make the life of each individual entire in *length* and *breadth*, and at the same time efficiently subserve the rearing of young, and do both these not only without hindering other individuals from doing the like, but while giving aid to them in doing the like." Again, in another place, he says: "The better a man fulfils every requirement of life, alike as regards his own body and mind, as regards the bodies and minds of those dependent on him, and as regards the bodies and minds of his fellowmen, the more varied do his activities become," and, we may add, the more moral does his conduct become. From such passages as these we can infer Mr. Spencer's formula of moral conduct. Moralization, according to him, consists in the preservation of life in *length* and advancement of it in *breadth*, alike in the individual and in the members of society generally. By length of life he means the duration of individual life, and by breadth the amount of life or "the quantity of changes which constitute life," consequent on the increasing adaptation of conduct to the differentiating and multifarious ends of life. But for another passage, in his *Data of Ethics*, which apparently points to a different conclusion, we might understand him to include in the conception of a complete life, with which the ideally moral life is identified, intellectual and æsthetic culture. He says: "Though it is unusual to consider as having a moral aspect those activities which culture involves, yet to the few who hold that due exercise of all the higher faculties, intellectual and

æsthetic, must be included in the conception of complete life here identified with the ideally moral life, it will be manifest that a a further heterogeneity is implied by them." From the above passage we see that Mr. Spencer not only does not shut out the more comprehensive view, but even takes care to show its compatibility with his own, inasmuch as the former follows from the simple extension of the principle underlying the latter. I think that this higher aspect of life cannot be altogether omitted from a scientific account of moral life. It is as much one's duty to cultivate one's talents and æsthetic sense and to help others in the cultivation of the same as to continue one's physical existence, and help others to continue theirs. Nay, we might even say that the latter derives its imperativeness only from the former. Quality of life has to be taken into account as much as length and quantity of life, in the estimation of the moral worth of a person (but only *in so far as it is the result of steady and strenuous exertion*); for the natural play of talents and æsthetic imagination does not imply voluntary control which alone can give moral colour to conduct and moral tone to character. The qualitative aspect of life we might with propriety designate its *height*. It has to be noted that these three aspects of life are not independent of one another; for while the quantity of life depends largely on its quality, both alike depend on its length. Moralization consists in the advancement of life in length, breadth, and height, and the extent to which an individual advances life in length, breadth, and height, in himself and others, is the proper measure of his morality. But Mr. Spencer does not stop here. Affected with the vice of the utilitarians he looks up beyond the advancement of life, to the clear gain in happiness resulting from such advancement, as the only rational and ultimate end of life. The coupling of the end of happiness with the sanction from pleasure lays his system open to all the criticisms directed against utilitarianism.

Mr. Spencer, fired with enthusiasm and hope, foresees the happy millennium of complete moralization looming over the distant horizon of the future, towards which human society is steadily sailing, and on reaching which the maximum of happiness will be everywhere and for all, and misery nowhere. In the last stages of evolution society and the individuals composing it will have passed from the state of moving equilibrium of progress to the perfectly stable equilibrium of stagnation, without strife and without pain. Then every individual will be equally egoistic and altruistic, and

the equalization of happiness will be complete. Does this not provoke a criticism even from the evolutionist's standpoint? If the inevitable and indispensable condition of progress is stress and competition, struggle for existence, and if the struggle or competition is prompted, according to Mr. Spencer himself, by the desire for pleasure, or by the keen edge of pain, then with the maximum of happiness, and no pain, progress must terminate; and the termination of progressive evolution is the beginning of retrogression and dissolution. Can such be the rational end of progress? Can any limit be set to progress? As Mr. Spencer keenly criticizes the principle of the greatest happiness of the greatest number, his system is not probably liable to the above criticism, which would apply if it were intended simply to give a rational basis to utilitarianism as expounded and interpreted by the representative philosophers of that school. The ideal social state of Mr. Spencer is one in which all men would be happy, as they would suffer no pain, and moral as they would inflict no pain on others. It is evident that by happiness to be attained in the millennium of evolution Mr. Spencer means the specific kind of happiness better called satisfaction, which presupposes and springs from the exercise of faculties and functions ot life adapted to environment in general, and to the social state in particular. We cannot reasonably assign any limit to the growth and development of man's powers, the knowledge acquired by their exercise, and generally to human progress, without abandoning our faith in evolution and its infinite protentiality. The further progress of the ideal state of Mr. Spencer is not only possible but necessary. The necessity for further progress arises from his conception of the end.

If happiness is the end of individual conduct, and of social evolution at all, it must mean the greatest happiness of the greatest number, or rather of all mankind, including material happiness incident to the external conditions of life. But while all might be happy in the ideal society of Mr. Spencer, all might not be happy in the same or highest degree. The inequalities in the conditions of life, arising from the differences in environment, would be such as to cause inequalities in the amount of happiness enjoyed by each individual. Every rational being that would seek happiness would seek the greatest happiness attainable under the existing conditions. Thus would ensue once more a conflict, a healthy competition among individuals, which would sustain the powers already developed, and probably also conduce to the development

of new ones. Here altruism might be altogether dropped from our account of morality, as the individual would be incapable of positive injury to others, but would be bound to seek his own greatest happiness, according to his highest reason, and thereby develop the life in him in conformity with the law of evolution—the grand law of progress in Nature. But unless at this stage, at least, we regard the advancement of life as an end in itself, we shall once more be caught in the snare of utilitarianism. For if, under existing conditions, the moralist requires the avoidance of pain to oneself and the alleviation of pain in others, it is quite reasonable and proper to demand that the happiness obtained should be distributed impartially among all, without admitting the superior claims of any individual on any ground. In fact the utilitarian principle of greatest and equal happiness becomes a practicable end only in the ideal society depicted by Mr. Spencer. Here is an ideal beyond an ideal. All the confusion arising from the attempt to conceive the utilitarian end of happiness, even as rationalized by Mr. Spencer, is due to the attempt to positively describe the ideal of human progress. The ideal of complete life in the individual and society, with general happiness as its invariable concomitant, can be expressed only in the form of a general law of progress, and, if at all, conceived only negatively.

The question naturally arises at this point, whether the natural laws of the evolution of life, struggle for existence, and survival of the fittest, should be rigorously upheld in favour of the purely selfish, to the increasing misery of the people around, or general happiness should be realized in contravention of the laws of progress. To the rich who are also selfish and devoid of sympathy the philosophy of the natural evolution of life would be most welcome, for being rich they would under existing conditions be the fittest to live; but for the poor it would mean destruction. Under the changed conditions of human society, where might is no longer right, but where individuals do not always stand on their own legs, the conception of fitness has changed, and has become somewhat indefinite. When we see that the fittest, according to a common standard, do not often survive or thrive, we are inclined to infer fitness from survival or prosperity. To the socialist the philosophy of moral evolution as expounded by Mr. Spencer will seem the highest and truest. If natural evolution, the main principle of which is strife, on an imperfect view, is inhuman, moral evolution, which with increasing altruism lessens strife, and seems to run counter to it, would seem

unnatural. Mr. Kidd in his *Social Evolution* points out that altruism as contravening the law of stress and competition has no rational sanction, and thereby brings out the inconsistency of moral evolution with the natural. The supposed inconsistency is only apparent, however, and can be explained away on a wider and more comprehensive view of human evolution. I shall here only point out that moral evolution, consisting in the growth and expansion of altruism, is part of natural evolution, and cannot contradict it by contravening the law of stress and competition,—an indispensable condition of progress. The philosophy of morals must be such as will express and describe the progress of moral evolution without subverting the laws of natural evolution.

Next, as to the evolutional sanction of morality, the evolution of life would be a dream, says Mr. Spencer, but for the law of self-conservation, or more generally, of life-conservation—a law not of human nature only but of all sentiency, according to which pleasure is the concomitant of heightened life, and pain of depressed life; in other words, as pleasure conduces to the heightening of life, the heightening of life yields ever new pleasure; and as pain leads to the depression of life, the depression of life engenders pain. It does not fall within the scope of this paper to examine this doctrine. But in passing I may note some obvious criticisms of it. As pleasures often insensibly pass into pain and tend to depress life instead of heightening it, the first part of the law is not unexceptionable. As the heightening of the physical, intellectual, moral, and religious life is always accompanied with some kind of satisfaction or pleasure, and as the subsequent lowering of life in all these aspects is followed by some kind of pain, we may admit the second part of the law without exception. When the second part of the law alone is admitted to be universally valid, much doubt is cast on the primary law, that pleasure and pain are the sole motive powers in life, the one furthering progress, the other preventing regress. They are really the consequence and not the cause of life and its conditions. Of the brute creation generally, which have no self-consciousness, the statement would be unwarranted, that they make pleasure the end of pursuit, or that pleasure is their motive to action. All the actions that conduce to the ends of self-preservation and race-preservation, are prompted primarily by certain impulses, which deepen and strengthen with exercise and experience under the influence of feeling. With man, however, the order in nature becomes inverted. In the light of his self-consciousness, pleasure,

the consequence of the fulfilment of life-functions, becomes the supreme motive of all conduct. If we but reflect and hold the mirror of our consciousness up to nature, we shall see, that in the order of nature progress is from life to life, a lower to a higher, charged with a sort of electric current of happiness, which is better called satisfaction. Mr. Spencer and many others believe that pleasure is the motive power in the progressive evolution of humanity, and that as long as it continues to be so, the world will grow more and more intellectual, moral, and religious. But I believe that, unless guided by a different principle of action, the life of average individuals will remain at a low ebb, and the progress of the world will be slow. It would be of some interest to consider how a world full of selfish men, having no motive for action but their happiness or the happiness of the families with which they severally identify themselves, could continue to grow moral. If moral life is only instrumental to the advancement of life in general, in its length, breadth, and height—is only a means to a higher end—then the realization of that end somehow is in a sense tantamount to moralization; and as this end is in process of realization in the world in which we live, the world may be said to grow more and more moral. To understand the process we have to go a little deeper in our analysis of the conditions of life and its advancement. Do we live to work, or work in order to live? From the point of view of nature and reason, we live to work, and work to develop our life. From the common man's point of view we work in order to live, and live for pleasure. Whatever the final end of work, we cannot lose sight of the fact that winning bread and preserving life are the immediate ends of conduct. With the advance of civilization clothing becomes as important as food, so that food and clothing are universally admitted to be the necessaries of life. It is a common opinion that no absolute distinction can be drawn between necessaries and luxuries; for what seems a luxury to one man may seem a necessary to another. In a given sense what is a luxury to one is a luxury to all. But when one who can afford it courts it for pleasure habitually, it then ceases to be a luxury and becomes a necessary for him. If what is regarded as luxury by the poor were avoided by the rich also, unmindful of pleasures and comforts, all work other than that which directly conduces to the mere maintenance of life would be waste. The scope of work would then become extremely limited, and life, which is destined to develop in breadth and height, would be poor and

shallow. Happily every man seeks such an amount of pleasure as his means will allow, and sets a high value on all kinds of work that minister to his comfort and enjoyment. Everything that directly or indirectly conduces to merely animal or sensual or to intellectual and æsthetic pleasure has its market value. While with growing needs work becomes more and more differentiated, with differentiation of work needs also grow. While every kind of work adds to the amenities and comforts of those whom fortune favours, it develops special capacities and powers in the individuals who are engaged in it. When we remember that division of labour is the first principle of economic and efficient life and work, and that the demand for more, for ever greater and greater pleasure, is almost instinctive and insatiable in man, we can understand how men even as they desire their own pleasure, further life in all the three dimensions, by encouraging work of every kind, by promoting the industrial and fine arts, and by advancing the sciences on which these depend. This is how the world grows more and more moral, while the individual continues to be all along selfish. But the rate of progress would then be extremely slow, increasing only with the increasing moralization of individuals; for our own experience fully proves that pleasure as an end is fitful in its continuance and varied in its kind. As pleasure flickers from moment to moment, the arts if made to live on it, could not have a steady and healthy growth. Music and painting, for which the Indian has great aptitude, do not flourish as they might. It may be that genius in music and painting as in everything else can be found only rarely and at long intervals. It is nevertheless true that genius is none the less a natural product, and cannot arise out of all relation to the circumstances and conditions of the time and place of its birth. The decay of art-sense in a people is mainly due to want of due encouragement from those who can appreciate art and make it live in those in whom it appears. The want of proper encouragement is due not to the indifference, much less the aversion, of men at any time to music and painting, but to the fitful motive of pleasure, which is not as strong in one as it is in another, nor as strong in the same individual at one time as at another time. Further, as artists give pleasure only for a price and at the cost of some other pleasure, they fail to hold the attention of men. This one instance I cite in order to show how pleasure when made the direct object of pursuit, while generally furthering life in all its dimensions, allows it to

sink down in some respects from the height to which it has risen. Complete moralization of the individual, by making him love life for its own sake, and regard advancement of life in length, breadth, and height as the rational end of existence, can alone prevent retrogression, and steadily and rapidly advance the world's progress. Bentham once declared that the word *ought* ought to be banished from the English language, and probably the last use he himself made of the word was in that connection. With greater justice the word pleasure should be banished from the vocabulary of morals, as it works mischief in practice, when presented by the moralist to ordinary minds as the sole sanction or the sole end of morals, and presents to the moralist himself the insoluble riddle of the evolution of pure altruism from pure egoism. The vice of the utilitarian and evolutional morality springs from its method. Instead of explaining the admitted facts of morality by tracing them to their roots by analysis, these systems start with a highly questionable assumption, and try to rear the whole moral edifice upon it; in other words, they are bent at any sacrifice on raising a grand superstructure on a very narrow foundation which alone, they think, they can confidently proclaim as solid and sound.

Mr. Leslie Stephen's system of ethics also points to the same conclusion, approaching the problem from the side of society. Human evolution is the progressive solution of the problem of elaborating the best type of society, which would show the highest degree of efficiency by the fulfilment of functions best adapted to the environment. Society is an organism, and its progress is one of moving equilibrium. The development of the social organism consists in the differentiation and development of diverse organs or associations, all organically united in one system. The first and fundamental condition of social efficiency is the moralization of individuals, which consists in the identification on their part of their interests with those of the associations to which they belong. To render the same in Mr. Spencer's language, society evolves according to laws. With the evolution of society, social efficiency increases, which implies the advancement of life generally in breadth and height, and the capability of such society to endure longer. As the life of society is preserved in length, and advances in breadth and height only as the individuals in it approximate more and more to complete living, Mr. Stephen's system may be taken as complementary to Mr. Spencer's.

Here one serious objection to the procedure thus far followed,

and to the theory just summed up, must be answered. Does not morality pertain rather to the individual than to society? Is it not internal? What does it avail to point out the direction in which the laws of human nature, as manifested in social evolution, are tending? If complete life is the final end of morality, and if it is realisng itself in individuals, and consequently in society, in the course of evolution, which has its necessary stages, the highest possible contribution from the individual towards such end would be so little as to give him no satisfaction for his conduct. Is not perfection of character a more rational end, of conduct for the individual, as it is more directly realised in him, is internal, and is independent of either act or consequence?

Life in its completeness conceived as the end of individual conduct, is certainly internal as it is bound up with the individual's very being. If it be urged that life as an end is external in so far as it includes human life generally and therefore life external to the individual, the objection applies equally to the view of moralists who hold perfection in oneself as well as in others as the rational end of conduct for the individual. Again, if by perfection is meant the development and realisation of self as a whole, it cannot be better expressed than in terms of life, the phenomenal aspect of self, which is best known to us, and is the necessary correlate of the noumenal self. Mr. Leslie Stephen, however, admits the legitimacy of the above criticism, and himself declares that morality relates to the character of the individual, and that the moral law being internal has to be expressed in the form: "Be this and not do this." The two forms, it seems to me, are not mutually exclusive, but stand in necessary relation to each other. Character out of relation to conduct defined with reference to an end, is an enigma. It would then mean simply a uniformity without any definite content, which we know is no proper criterion of the morality of the individual or the rightness of his conduct; for a villain may sustain his character as uniformly and as consistently as a virtuous man. The character of an individual, as having a moral import, depends on the nature of the end of his conduct. Character and the supreme end of right conduct being thus correlated, it would seem immaterial whether we express the moral law in the form, "Be good by possessing a good will," or in the form, "Preserve and perfect life in thyself as well as in others." But there are certain obvious reasons for preferring the first to the second. Certainly what we are or become depends on what we have done or do. To become what

we should be, we must do what we ought to do. Though the relatively external end of life to which conduct relates has in the order of development evident priority to character (which is internal), considered as an end in itself, the latter has, and rightly, acquired priority over the former in our moral estimate. For it is a simple and definite state of being more completely attained in the individual by discipline and practice; and when attained it affords the highest security for uniform right conduct. Further, as every individual is a better judge of the attitude or disposition of his own mind than of the consequences immediate and remote of his conduct as affecting life, and as the end of life though definite in conception, is indefinite in extent, and becomes indeterminate and many-sided in respect of the means pursued for the realization of it in practice, one has the greatest assurance of the subjective rightness of his disposition, and derives the highest satisfaction from it.

It is no real objection to the view above set forth to say that the end of complete life that would probably be attained by the race, after an infinite number of successive stages of evolution, is far too remote and far too high to deserve any notice from men, under existing conditions. For, as Mr. Spencer, in the penultimate chapter of his *Data of Ethics*, clearly explains, the ideal, though unattainable in the present life, serves as a guide in the practice of morality here and now by men with the incident limitations of their nature, in so far as it expresses the law of progress,—the law of right conduct in its simplicity,—abstracted from the special conditions peculiar to the different phases of society at the different stages of its progress.

We see, then, that the view here developed, far from being opposed to the perfection theory of intuitional morality, is only consistent with, complementary to, and a necessary correlative to it. Further, this view may be taken as expressing, in the concrete, the theory of Kant given in the abstract. Every person, Kant declares, is an end in himself, and the maxim of conduct based on this view is thus expressed: "Treat humanity in thy own person as well as in others, always as an end and never as a means." Readers of Kant are well aware that his theory is too formal and abstract to be applied in practice. Rational nature alone, according to him, constitutes humanity. To abstract the rational from the sensitive or emotional side of human nature, and to treat it as the ideal of morality, is to deal with superhuman ethics. Rationality and

humanity are but abstractions, and cannot be conceived as the end of human conduct. Humanity as a practicable end of conduct could only mean ideal human life; and ideal human life is so far concrete as it is defined with reference to the most general conditions of life. The ideal in conduct is the possible, linked to the actual by the laws of human volition. The abstract Kantian theory may be given practical shape, thus: "Life is an end in itself, and therefore it behoves every individual to treat life in himself as well as in others, always as an end, never as a means, and advance life in length, breadth, and height."

S. SUBRAHMANYA SASTRI.

THE REPORT OF THE INDIAN EDUCATION COMMISSION IN THE LIGHT OF THE RECENT PROCEEDINGS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

THE Proceedings of the Government of India dated Simla, the 28th October, 1899, are likely to have various important effects. One effect will be, or at all events ought to be, the reawakening of interest in the Report of the Education Commission. To promote such interest and, as far as possible, to direct it rightly, is the purpose of the present article.

The Report is a very full and accurate discussion of the history of modern education in India up to 1882, and of its defects and needs at that date. Every part of the Report has its uses. Every part of it ought to be carefully studied and always kept in view by those who are entrusted with the detailed administration of educational affairs. The greater part, however, of the bulky volume has little reference to those broad outlines of educational policy to which attention has been prominently drawn by the Government of India, and on which it is desirable that a sound public opinion should be formed.

Most of the conclusions arrived at and of the recommendations made in the Report seem to have met with substantially universal approval, or at all events are not opposed in any way that calls for notice. This remark applies to the introductory chapter, to the

chapter entitled 'Historical Review of Education in India', and to the chapters on 'Indigenous Schools' as well as on Primary, Secondary, and Collegiate, Education; that is, to the first six chapters, which together make up the larger half, of the Report.

Nearly as much may be said concerning the principles laid down and the recommendations made in Chapters IX., X., XI., and XII. These chapters deal with 'The Education of Classes requiring Special Treatment', with 'Female Education', with 'Educational Legislation', and with 'Educational Finance'. Many points, indeed, in these last four chapters have received far too little attention; but the failure to attend to them has arisen rather from want of funds and from the too prevalent *vis inertiæ* in all educational affairs than from anything which the chapters contain being objected to by any one. With regard to all the chapters thus enumerated, nothing seems to be required except that some pains should be taken by Local Governments to make sure that every officer of the Education Department, from the highest to the lowest, shall make himself thoroughly acquainted with them and shall always act on the recommendations they contain. There seems no ground to think that those officers will prove reluctant to do so, if they only have funds enough at their disposal.

The case is unfortunately different with regard to those parts of the Report which aim at laying down in detail the policy which ought to be pursued towards private effort in education. The principles on which those parts proceed and the recommendations contained in them, are still opposed by some Education Departments; and these Departments have been supported by more than one Local Government. It is unnecessary to adduce any proof of this since the publication of the Proceedings which have led to this article being written. In them, after surveying the whole educational field, the Government of India pronounces the inattention to "the principles laid down for guidance" to be "only too general." While it declares that "the most manifest transgressor is the Government of the North-Western Provinces and Oudh," it finds in the language of the Madras Government and the avowed action of the Madras Department "the clearest statement of the transgression or neglect of these principles."

The Education Department in Madras has been pretty steadily hostile to that education under private managers which it was the main purpose of the Despatch of 1854—the basis of all Indian education—to encourage and develop. Its antagonism to private

effort did more than any other single cause to bring about the appointment of the Commission in 1882. How strongly the Commission condemned the way in which the Madras Department had acted, especially in immediately preceding years, may be read in almost innumerable paragraphs of its Report. Those who wish to judge of the matter for themselves may turn, among many others, to paragraphs 449, 452, 453, 459, and 489. Many of the defects pointed out by the Commission were remedied, some of them while it was still sitting and others afterwards. Indeed for some years it seemed likely that the policy laid down for the guidance of Education Departments in their relations to private effort would be adopted in its entirety in Madras. No small part of the reforms effected in those years still remains. In particular, such open attacks on Aided Institutions as were made before 1882 are no longer to be feared. By 1889, however, it was beginning to be clear that the disfavour of the Madras Department for private effort was again at work, especially as regarded private effort for providing the more advanced kinds of education, the very portion of the field in which the Despatch of 1854 and the Government of India, in 1884, had given instructions that it should be particularly encouraged. This disfavour has been steadily on the increase. As the Government of India has pointed out, it had gone so far by 1894 that it seemed perfectly "natural" to Lord Wenlock to declare publicly that Government regarded a departmental institution as "its own particular child" and institutions under private managers as "strangers." I had it from Lord Wenlock himself that this attitude towards private effort was the result of all that he had heard from his educational advisers from the time when he came to Madras, and that it was a perfectly new idea to him that the extension and improvement of institutions under private managers was meant to be "the principal care of the Department." Since 1894 this disfavour has been increasing, until it has borne the fruit of the recently proposed additions to the Grant-in-Code, which, as they are still under discussion by Government, it is undesirable to do more than refer to here. The disfavour, it is true, has taken a less open form since it revived, though a form that is not on that account less dangerous. It is visible enough, to those who look a little below the surface, that this Presidency affords ample proof of the correctness of the conclusion at which the Government of India arrives in its Proceedings, *viz.*, that "great need exists for steady general supervision to keep

the local Educational Departments faithful to the broad lines of the declared policy of Government."

But there is equal need that those who are interested in education should acquaint themselves with the portions of the Commission's Report which have till now been kept more or less in abeyance, in order that the full force of enlightened public opinion may come to the help of the Government of India in its renewed attempt to place education, not only theoretically but in practice, upon a sound and healthy footing. Now the parts of the Report which some Education Departments, and conspicuously the Madras Department, have hitherto been counterworking are to be found in Chapter VII. (on 'The Internal Administration of the Department') and in Chapter VIII., which discusses 'The External Relations of the Department to Individuals and Public Bodies'. These chapters are in entire conformity with the Report as a whole. They merely set forth principles which appear more or less explicitly in every part of it. Still, the policy defined and the recommendations contained in them are, so to speak, the essence of the Report in regard to all the points which if not expressly are still practically disputed.

Much, however, of Chapter VII. may be regarded as accepted by every one. Only a few special portions require close attention. Perhaps it will be enough to refer to only *four* out of its *forty-two* paragraphs. These are the following. Paragraph 349 dwells on the importance of educational Conferences, which for many years until very lately have been if not absolutely yet practically abandoned in Madras, though they are even more necessary than elsewhere in a province where private effort plays so conspicuous a part. Paragraphs 351 and 354 deal with the relation of the Department to schools in competition, particularly with regard to fees. They proceed on principles directly contrary to those on which the Department acts at present in this Presidency. Paragraph 372 is a protest against public examinations in the middle of a school curriculum. Such examinations are not indeed strictly compulsory with us; but it is well known how much the Department has desired to make them virtually compulsory, though in consequence of recent discussions it has somewhat resiled from its former position.

A much larger proportion of Chapter VIII. than of Chapter VII. refers to points on which the "principles laid down for guidance" have been "transgressed or neglected." Even of it, however, many parts are not in dispute and do not call for special notice.

The chapter is divided into twelve sections, of which the last is merely a recapitulation of recommendations. Section 1, which treats of 'The Relation of the State to non-Departmental Effort', Section 2, which recounts 'The Growth of Private Enterprise in Education', and Section 3, which gives 'A General View of the Education provided by Private Effort' as in 1882, are no doubt, all of them, accepted everywhere as fair and comprehensive statements of plain facts. It is probably the same with Section 4, in which the advantages and disadvantages of different systems of grants-in-aid are discussed at considerable length. But Section 5 (on the principles which ought to regulate the amount of grants), Section 6 (on points suggested by the evidence), and Section 7 (on the right relations of private effort with the Department and competing private institutions), contain many points which have never been accepted, or at least never adequately acted on, in this Presidency, and some points against which the Department has consistently struggled with all its might. Section 8 (on the relations of private effort with Local and Municipal Boards) is of very particular importance at present. Section 9 (on the future of aided education) and Section 11 (on indirect aids which ought to be accorded to private effort) call attention to many things which are still unknown in educational administration here, but which must be introduced if the policy of the Education Commission, that is to say, the policy authoritatively laid down by the Government of India, is ever to be so much as fairly tried. Section 10 (on the withdrawal of the State from the provision of education) propounds many salutary and necessary principles, but is of less importance than the others, since its main subject is not one concerning which there is pressing need for any immediate action.

Thus, for practical purposes at present, Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 11 of Chapter VIII. of the Report are the parts of it that need to be studied by those who wish to understand the real educational questions of the day, and to give what help they can in solving them. They extend from page 416 to page 451, and again from page 470 to page 475 of the Report. It is not too much to ask that every reader of the Magazine who can get access to the Report of the Commission should make himself acquainted with these forty pages. He will find them interesting as well as useful. For one thing, he will find it interesting to speculate on how it has been possible for Report after Report on Public Instruction to declare, in the face of these forty pages, that the policy of the Education Commission has

been carried out in Southern India. On this point, however, it is unnecessary to dwell. The Government of India has finally disposed of it. In its view the radical principles of that policy have been steadily "transgressed or neglected."

It is in the highest degree hopeful that the Supreme Government, after referring to a resolution which regards private effort in education not as an enemy to be crushed but a friend to be encouraged, distinctly says in its late Proceedings: "This neglect of principles plainly laid down for guidance cannot be permitted; and the Government of India must insist on the practical observance of the instructions contained in the Resolution above quoted." Still, the Government of India has many things to think of, and Departments are often very determined as well as both indirectly and directly extremely powerful. There is therefore much need for the action of a healthy and watchful public opinion if even the plainest instructions of superior authority are not to continue to be practically set aside. A widespread study of the parts of the Education Commission's Report which have hitherto been but little exemplified in practice, is the best available means of forming it.

I shall close this article by referring to some paragraphs which are of immediate and very special importance. Most of them, but not all, are in the sections of Chapter VIII. to which attention has already been invited.

Paragraphs 448 and 450 are important as showing the comparative cost to public funds of institutions under private managers and of those directly Government institutions which most of the Departments desire to foster at their expense.

In the end of paragraph 463, again in the end of paragraph 485, and in paragraph 529, there are important observations on the effect of "passing examinations being the only goal which instructors keep in view"—the evil which has long been doing greater harm than any other in our whole plan of education, though attempts to get the Department to help in curing it have hitherto been in vain.

Paragraph 475 is important because it shows the views of the Commission as to there being an efficient high school in every district, and because it is plain from the late Proceedings that these views have been somewhat misapprehended by the Government of India. Paragraph 476 is an attempt to determine "an approximate average of what the rate of aid ought to be." It admits that circumstances are too various to allow of any rate of aid being authoritatively laid

down, but it propounds some guiding principles to which little regard seems ever to have been paid in the educational administration of this Presidency.

Besides what has been above referred to, paragraph 485 contains important remarks on the need there is that in the matter of raising adequate fees "the schools that are most closely connected with Government, as being naturally the strongest and most stable, must lead the way." This is the very pivot of the policy of the Commission towards private effort; but even in the years that immediately followed the sitting of the Commission, and still more decidedly in recent years, it has been set aside by the Madras Department.

Paragraph 486 deals with "the complaint of want of sympathy in administration," for which complaint the grounds have by no means disappeared.

Paragraph 489 shows how broad and candid was the view taken by the Commission of the whole question of the relation of the Departments to private effort. It not only accepts but puts prominently forward every fair excuse for that "want of sympathy" which it declares to have been so hurtful.

Paragraphs 490—498 are probably, in the present point of view, the most important in the Report. They lay down the conditions that "must be practically recognized in some fair degree if private effort is ever to take the place it is meant to fill." The six pages in which those conditions are discussed ought to be carefully studied by every one who wishes to help in forming a healthy public opinion on the questions about education which for the present are most pressing. Any one who studies them will easily see that while few of the conditions which the Commission pronounces indispensable are perfectly fulfilled in Madras, some of them are scarcely being fulfilled at all.

Paragraph 505 deals with the "possible increase of fees in different classes of Institutions," chiefly by means of that "friendly co-operation of managers" which the action of the Madras Government and its Education Department for the last eight years is exactly fitted to make impossible.

Paragraph 515 is important, or at least interesting, because while recommending that so long as they are still required Government colleges should be maintained in full efficiency, it points out that "their full efficiency does not mean their indefinite expansion." The line followed in the expansion of the Madras Presidency College has been such in recent years as almost to suggest that the

Department was guided by this paragraph in persuading the Local Government to do exactly the things which, according to the Commission, should on no account be done.

Finally, paragraph 525 contains valuable remarks on the need of variety in the type of education, than which scarcely anything is more important if education is to do the work which it ought to do in India. *Whether by definite intention or not, the effect of the* Department's action in Southern India is to cast all education in a single mould fashioned by itself alone.

One who masters the paragraphs I have thus enumerated will have little difficulty in seeing the real source of a very large part of the chief difficulties and defects of South Indian education. There are indeed defects and difficulties which not the best system in the world could speedily remove. Many of the current wild complaints against Indian education and its fruits spring from neglect of the very elementary principle that new things need time to grow and that the most precious things are the things which grow most slowly;—not to add that the complaints in question have sometimes a still more ignoble origin. This, however, affords no reason why defects should be allowed to remain which might easily and quickly be removed. Certainly not the whole, but in my opinion the larger half, of the evils which attach to our education as it is at present, might be cured at no distant date if the recommendations which the Commission made, after *the fullest possible investigation and*, discussion and deliberation, were frankly accepted and fully carried out.

It is well that attention is being called in Britain as well as by the Government of India to the failure to act on recommendations which have such weighty authority behind them. It is well that the greatest organ of public opinion in the world, even when attention is so much engrossed with sadder and more exciting themes, should have turned its light upon this failure. This has been done in a recent article in the *Times*. The article has been reprinted by some papers in this country, and is certain to attract the notice of those in Britain who are thoughtful observers of whatever tends to promote the real welfare of India. As yet the *Times* has dealt only with that particular evil of putting 'passing' in the place of education against which this Magazine has repeatedly inveighed, and to which attention was also called by Father Sewell in the paper addressed to the Director of Public Instruction which not long ago was noticed in these columns. It may be hoped that the *Times* will in due course take notice of some of the many other ways in

which, both in Madras and elsewhere, the purposes of the Government of India have been frustrated by the crude and narrow departmentalism of those whom it appoints to carry out its orders. One need not agree with everything that the article which has lately appeared contains. It puts things somewhat strongly and draws rather sweeping conclusions from comparatively narrow premises. Yet even this may prove useful when attention has to be awakened and discussion requires to be made thorough. Certainly no one need hesitate to agree with the general conclusion to which the article leads up,—namely, that when the difficulties in the way would be serious even if the best of systems were adopted, it is a blunder to increase those difficulties by working upon faulty methods.

WILLIAM MILLER.

LITERARY NOTICES.

Auld Lang Syne. Second Series. My Indian Friends. By the Right Hon. Professor F. Max Müller. London and Bombay: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1899. Price 10*s.* 6*d.*

IN this volume Professor Max Müller tells the story of his acquaintance with Indian men and books—an acquaintance whose beginnings date back nearly sixty years. As he himself puts it, his India is not on the surface but lies many centuries beneath it; it is the ideal India of its ancient bards and philosophers that he knows. His India does not exist, never did exist, and never will exist, any more, as he points out, than the Greece of Homer or the Italy of Virgil. And though not without reason men who know the real India have been irritated that their statements about the country should be contradicted by one whose acquaintance with India was of this half-bookish, half-dreamland kind, much may be forgiven to a man who has so much sympathy with a race he does not really know. And this accounts for the affectionate regard in which Professor Max Müller is held in India. Many know that compared with younger men whose studies have been more concentrated his scholarship is flimsy. Much of what he has said about the sacred books of India would have provoked deep resentment had it come from other lips; but the assurance of his genuine interest in India and sympathy with her people makes them forget these things. It is strange that the charity that believeth all things good about the people of India should fail towards men with whom he has so much in common as most

missionaries. Of missionaries and mission work he seems to know practically nothing. But the spaces of his ignorance about them he fills, not with kindly fancies as in the case of the Hindus, but with monstrous distortions and imagined beings of almost supernatural folly. Professor Max Müller's ignorance of the real India of to-day comes out constantly in this volume. Even those Indian friends whom he met in the West were evidently seen by him only on one side. Of the Indian correspondents whom he never met he writes in such a way as to show that he has no conception of their life here. For Indian readers it is more important to note his views of books which he knew as well as or better than we can than to hear his ideas on people of whom we know more than he.

It will be well if some of his remarks on Indian literature are borne in mind. "I do not feel answerable," he says, "for having filled the brains of native scholars with exaggerated ideas about its value. Its value to us is great, but chiefly from a historical point of view, and this is just what native scholars find it so difficult to understand." What, for example, does Professor Max Müller say of the Vedas? Hindus know that to their study he has given his life, and, not understanding the conditions of European scholarship, naturally suppose that he seeks in them religious guidance. "But highly interesting as these Vedic hymns are to us, in spite of, or, I should say, on account of their simplicity and childishness, anybody who came to know them at first hand had to confess that they seem quite unfit to satisfy the religious cravings of a later generation. . . . All this is historically and psychologically full of interest, but there is little, except here and there, of exalted religious thought, of poetry or philosophy, still less of any records of historical events." Of the Vedanta he thinks more highly, but he makes no attempt to conceal his belief that it is a mere groping towards light which in Christianity is effulgent.

Hence it is easy to understand his attitude towards Theosophy. "Great and lasting mischief has been wrought for instance by Madame Blavatsky and her friends who went to India, ignorant of Sanskrit and Sanskrit literature, and who have for years been proclaiming to the world at large that Hindu philosophy, particularly that of the Vedânta and that of Buddhism, which they did not always distinguish very carefully from one another, was infinitely superior to all the philosophies of Europe. . . . . It is difficult not to get angry if one sees the elevated views of these ancient philosophers (of India) dragged down to the level of cloudy hallucinations, and rendered absurd by being mixed up with vulgar trickeries."

Throughout Professor Max Müller labours to show that his interest in Indian literature and philosophy is not that of the religious votary, but that of the student of the past, like that which Christian scholars of to-day feel in Plato. But if this be understood, he is willing to express

his admiration of the genius which could rear such systems at the time when the Vedic and Vedantic authors lived.

It need scarcely be said that this volume is as readable as the writer's previous work has been, and that the style is as lucid and easy as ever.

A Text-Book of Physics. By W. Watson, B.Sc. London, New York, and Bombay : Longmans, Green, and Co.

THE need of a good text-book of experimental physics at a moderate price has been long felt. Ganot's book held the field for many years, but it has been for long quite out of date. From time to time, indeed, paragraphs have been added to it, giving an account of recent researches, but these have but made the anachronisms of the rest the more apparent. Like the Irishman's gun, it needed to be repaired, stock, lock, and barrel. This process has now been carried out by Mr. Watson of the Royal College of Science, and a book has been produced which we have no doubt will be as widely appreciated as Ganot's was forty years ago.

The text has been entirely rewritten, and while a good many of the illustrations have been reproduced from Ganot, most of them are new. These are chiefly graphical representations of the variation of physical phenomena, and form one of the most valuable features of the book. On page 296, for instance, we find a diagram showing the mean temperature of the air and of the earth's crust at various depths for a whole year. By such means the facts are exhibited in a most interesting and comprehensive way.

As the whole subject is dealt with in a single octavo volume of about nine hundred pages, it is inevitable that there should be many omissions. On the whole, the subject matter has been judiciously chosen, and a due proportion maintained between its various parts. We are glad to observe that an account is given of Joly's steam calorimeter, and of his investigations with it of the specific heat of gases at constant volume. The results obtained are very accurate and valuable, although they have not received much notice in some of the larger books on physics. Among still more recent things we notice a good account of the Zeeman effect, and a chapter on the subject of electrical oscillations leading up to a description of Marconi's successful experiments in wireless telegraphy. To make room for such novelties much that found a place in the older books has necessarily been omitted. We are surprised, however, to find no reference to Crookes's radiometer, which illustrates so beautifully the kinetic theory of gases and the theory of exchanges. If no room could have been found for it otherwise, it might well have been got by omitting the description of that other tube of Crookes's which is sup-

posed to show the mechanical action of the kathode rays, as the cause of the action is still obscure.

We observe that in the printing a good many of the proper names have been misspelt, *e.g.*, Provost for Prévost, Branley for Branly, Brodhum for Brodhun, Dopler for Doppler, and that in the investigation of the distances of the object and the image from a mirror and a lens, the *v's* and the *r's* have been interchanged in more than one place. For a first edition, however, there are remarkably few misprints. We cordially recommend the book to the notice of students taking physics as their science subject.

Malate Madhava. A Tamil Version, by M. C. Sadagopa Chariar, with an Introduction in English, by Mr. V. Venugopal Chetty, I.C.S. Price annas 5.

In rendering into Tamil the famous Sanskrit comedy of Bhavabuti, Mr. Sadagopa Chariar might with advantage have adhered to the dramatic form of the original. But he has chosen to give it in running prose and in a simple and colloquial style intelligible to boys and girls, for whom it has been mainly intended. The translation would have been a valuable addition to the scanty store of Tamil prose literature if it had been revised by a Tamil scholar before it was sent to the press. Its value would also have been enhanced if the translator had omitted or modified certain passages of an indelicate character. However, the effort is a laudable one, and the encouragement that Mr. Venugopal Chetty has given to the publisher lays the Tamil reading public under a debt of gratitude to him. If men of his stamp and position will come forward and help those who are labouring to resuscitate and diffuse ancient Indian literature, it may be confidently hoped that the vernacular literatures of this country will have a glorious future.

In the short introduction contributed by Mr. Venugopal Chetty there is an unfortunate error, apparently typographical, which puzzles the reader somewhat.

Macbeth. Julius Cæsar. Richard II. The Swan Edition of Shakespeare's Plays. 1*s.* each. London, New York, and Bombay: Longmans, Green, and Co.

For the *format* of these books there can be scarcely anything but praise. The printing is clear, the binding strong and pretty, the illustrations, of which there are about a dozen in each volume, artistic and suggestive. The same introduction is given in each volume, *mutatis mutandis*. First comes a life of the poet, then a description of the play, then sec-

tions on Shakespearean grammar and versification. In the volumes before us the two middle sections are jejune. After the text are given the notes—altogether inadequate and showing little judgment or knowledge—and a number of examination questions. There is no index.

Summary of Ransome's Short History of England. London, New York, and Bombay: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1899. Price 1*s.*

THIS should be found by college students a useful synopsis of English history. The condensation has been in general well done, though in one or two cases the desire for brevity has made misconception possible. A large number of helpful plans and tables have been inserted. The arrangement of matter is good, and variation in the type used adds to its effectiveness.

Longmans' Colonial Library.
Red Pottage. By Mary Cholmondeley.

THE very first pages of this book, in which the orthodox duel between a wronged husband and his false friend is replaced by the drawing of lots, the drawer of the shorter of two pipe-lighters being bound in honour to commit suicide within five months, show that the writer is able to arrest the attention of the reader at the outset of her story, and as chapter follows chapter the story becomes of absorbing interest. It is not merely that the plot is original and clever, Miss Cholmondeley's style is brilliant, and she has the gift of making her characters seem alive. When one has put down the book and asks oneself whether people would have acted just as she draws them, a sceptical reply is scarcely avoidable; yet, while one is reading, that doubt does not occur —an evidence of the ability of the authoress to make her story real. This is partly due to the gift of vivid portraiture that she possesses. The straightforward strong Dick Vernon, the well-meaning Hugh Scarlett, who wrecks his life by easy wickedness and a fatal want of the courage to be entirely sincere, Rachel, whose noble soul has had to resist "the brunt of a whirlwind," Hester, the enthusiastic authoress, and half a dozen other persons in the book really move and speak. The dialogue is good, but the best pieces of writing are not put into the mouths of the characters. Even the modern woman does not speak in epigrams, and though a patient reader may endure the epigrammatic marionette for a season, verbal fireworks are in the wrong place in a dialogue, and it is a comfort to find them used sparingly and effectively in the narrative. The faith that there is good in the worst men and women, and the belief in the infinite tenderness of God, which Miss Cholmondeley emphatically accepts, brighten many of the sadder pages

of her story, and enable her to see how Hugh Scarlett, though he has bartered his birthright of pure love for the 'red pottage' of a sinful attachment, may yet be shriven, if he will but dare to be sincere. In a word, *Red Pottage* is not merely clever and thrilling, it is sympathetic and truthful. A special word of commendation ought to be given to the quotations that head the chapters; they are apt and interesting. From beginning to end Miss Cholmondeley's work is thoroughly well written, and merits the rapid and wide popularity it has attained.

The World's Desire. By H. Rider Haggard and Andrew Lang.

MESSRS. LONGMANS have now added to their Colonial Library the novel written in collaboration by Mr. Haggard and Mr. Lang. A book with which such writers are connected could not fail to have elements of power and charm, but it is marred by a fault which perhaps was inevitable. It is 'too clever by half'. Magic and mystery, Homeric literature, Hebrew Scripture and Egyptian lore, mystic philosophy and love and war are too strangely mingled together. But those who are interested in Odysseus and Helen, Moses and Meneptah, may see them here in an unwonted guise.

No Soul above Money. By Walter Raymond.

MR. RAYMOND has written a realistic novel of peasant life in an old-world English village. The book is distinctly an able one, but it is a very sad one, and the needless crime of which it tells the story step by step stands in ghastly contrast to the mirth of Wincanton Fair. The delineation of the fear and remorse that lay hold on poor Jack when he finds that he is a murderer is very powerful. Mr. Raymond has evidently made a careful study of old English folklore and of ancient village customs, and every page of his book reveals his ability to use his knowledge dramatically.

BESIDES other books which will receive separate notice we beg to acknowledge receipt of the following :—

From Messrs. Macmillan and Co., Limited, we have received two volumes of their Elementary Classics, *viz.*, Virgil's *Æneid*, Book XII., edited by T. E. Page, M.A., and *Passages for Greek Translation for Lower Forms*, by G. H. Peacock, M.A., and E. W. W. Bell, M.A.; Jules Verne's *Le Tour du Monde*, adapted and edited by Louis A. Barbé, B.A.; de Vogüé's *Cœurs Russes*, edited by Eugène Pellissier; Copée's *Contes Choisis*, edited by Margaret F. Skeat; *The Squire's Tale*, edited by A. W. Pollard; *Johnson's Life of Pope* and *Johnson's Life of Dryden*, edited by Peter Peterson, D.Sc.; *English Poetry for Schools*, Book I., selected and arranged by George Cookson, B.A.; *English Grammar*: Alternative Course, for Standards IV., V., VI., and VII., by J. C. Nesfield, M.A.; *Euclid*,

Books I. to IV., by I. Todhunter, D.Sc., F.R.S., and S. Loney, M.A.; *Euclid*, Books I. to IV., by Charles Smith, M.A., and Sophie Bryant, D.Sc.; *Exercises in Practical Physics*, Part II., by R. A. Gregory and A. T. Simmons, B.Sc.; *Combined Readers in Elementary Science and Geography*, Book I., by Vincent T. Murché; *Lessons in Domestic Science*, Part III., by Ethel R. Lush; and *Bookkeeping for Elementary Schools*, Stage I., by J. Thornton.

From Messrs. Longmans, Green, and Co., we have received *The Rights of the Church of England under the Reformation Settlement*, by Viscount Halifax; and two of *Longmans' Memory Maps*, viz., *Asia* and *Punjab*.

From the Christian Literature Society we have received *The Indian Sunday School Manual*, by T. J. Scott, D.D.; *Notes on the Gospel of Luke*; and *Agricultural Reform in India*, by A. O. Hume, C.B. Mr. Hume's essay is prefaced by a Letter addressed to the Viceroy and an Introduction by Dr. Murdoch, and the volume is a powerful plea for the organisation of a thoroughly equipped Agricultural Department in India.

The Asylum Press Almanac, Directory, and Compendium of Intelligence for 1900.

Asylum Press Pocket Almanac and General Directory for 1900.

Asylum Press Sheet Almanac, 1900.

We regret that circumstances, which are responsible for so many things in this country, prevented us from calling attention in our last issue to these most useful and interesting publications. It is perhaps not yet too late, however, to say a few words in commendation of them. In noticing a new edition of an important scientific book we remarked that it was practically impossible to keep a scientific work up to date. The same remark may be applied to almanacs and directories, which cannot but be out of date to some extent before they are published. What one looks for, therefore, in a publication like the large Almanac issued by the Lawrence Asylum Press is evidence that pains have been taken in the revision both of the information of a more or less permanent character and of that which is more or less new from year to year. In the Almanac before us we see many signs that such pains have been taken. That there is still room for improvement in various directions the publishers probably know as well as we do, and we shall hope that the Almanac for the first year of the next century will be as much in advance of the Almanac before us as this one is in advance of its predecessor. The map of Madras which accompanies the present issue is a great improvement on last year's map, but it does not give quite so much information as we should wish. Would it not be a good thing to publish the map in sections?

NOTES AND EXTRACTS.

Mr. Ranade's inaugural address at the Indian Social Conference this year was interesting alike in its aim and in its subject-matter. Its aim was to summon the Muhammadans and Hindus to unite together to pursue social reform. A word may be given to the skill with which Mr. Ranade plays the unifier. A man less careful to please everybody might alienate one section or the other to which he appeals. But Mr. Ranade, while he says enough to flatter the Muhammadan's pride in his work in India, judiciously throws the necessary sops to the Hindu. How far in this direction he is ready to go he shows by talking of his being "surrounded on all sides by the traditions of a civilization older than the oldest known to history." With a similar disregard of fact he tries to please his hearers by assuring them that their countryman Buddha's "'wheel of law' still regulates the thoughts and feelings of half the human race in its efforts to attain beatitude." Such *ad captandum* exaggeration is unworthy of the speaker and his cause. On the other hand Mr. Ranade has given to the Muhammadans credit for introducing into India inventions already known in this country. But when all such mistakes have been deducted, the address still has the great merit of showing that the Hindus owe very much to the Muhammadan conquests, and of constructing a bridge across the gulf between the two communities. It may perhaps be said that until each has done rather more for itself it is doubtful whether there is room for any practical and effectual co-operation, but Mr. Ranade gives a long list of matters in which both alike come short, and in which combined effort is desirable.

"In the backwardness of female education, in the disposition to overleap the bounds of their own religion, in matters of temperance, in their internal dissensions between castes and creeds, in the indulgence of impure speech, thought, and action on occasions when they are disposed to enjoy themselves, in the abuses of many customs in regard to unequal and polygamous marriages, in the desire to be extravagant in their expenditure on such occasions, in the neglect of regulated charity, in the decay of public spirit in insisting on the proper management of endowments,—in these and other matters both communities are equal sinners, and there is thus much ground for improvement on common lines."

The lesson the speaker draws from the past is "that in this vast country no progress is possible unless both Hindus and Muhammadans join hands together." To stir both to "mutual sympathy, and co-operation, and a perfect tolerance," is the aim of the address.

Mr. Ranade here takes a more comprehensive view of Indian society than before. He treats in this address of the Muhammadans and the Sikhs. Might he not, in some future address, consider the place of the

Christians in Indian life? His attempt in this address to refer the Arya Samaj and the Brahmo Samaj to the reform movements which have a purely Oriental origin is a confirmation of the charge which has recently been made against him and his school that they try deliberately to suppress recognition of the influence of Christianity in India.

Mr. Ranade bases his appeal for co-operation between Hindus and Muhammadans in the work of social reform upon a review of the influence of the latter upon the former during the period of their supremacy in India. He first gives from Alberuni, Babar, and other Muhammadan writers a rather thin picture of India as it was before and during the Muslim invasions. Then he describes the work of Akbar and how it was undone by Aurangzib. The century from the accession of Akbar to the fall of Shahjahan may be "regarded as the halcyon period of Indian history when the Hindu and Muhammadan races acted in full accord. If in place of Aurangzib, Dara Sheko had succeeded to power as the eldest son of Shahjahan, the influences set on foot by the genius of Akbar would have gathered strength, and possibly averted the collapse of the Mogul power for another century. This was, however, not to be so, and with Aurangzib's ascent to the throne, a change of system commenced which gathered force during the long time that this Emperor reigned."

Aurangzib, it is true, failed in his reactionary policy, but is Mr. Ranade correct in saying that Aurangzib "in his last moments admitted that his whole life was a mistake"? He had fought, he held to the last, for true religion and for God; and though success such as he had hoped had not been his, he would not wish that like Akbar he had departed from the path laid down in the Koran. The unity which Akbar had sought broke to pieces on the rock of orthodoxy; and so long as Hinduism and Islam retain their hold upon their followers there can be no true union among them. Akbar saw this and tried to establish a new religion for all his subjects. Mr. Ranade apparently applauds this, and has kindly words for Sikhism and the other half-Muhammadan, half-Hindu systems. But such praise from one who remains a Hindu can mean but little. It reveals only a flabby invertebrateness of thought.

This temporary unity is the first of the benefits which Mr. Ranade attributes to Muslim supremacy in India. "Since the time of Asoka the element of strength born of union was wanting in the old Hindu dynasties who succumbed so easily to the Muhammadan invaders."

He proceeds :—

"Besides this source of strength, there can be no doubt that in a hundred other ways the Muhammadan domination helped to refine the tastes and manners of the Hindus. The art of government was better understood by the Muhammadans than by the old Hindu sovereigns. The art of war also was singularly defective till the Muhammadans came. They brought in the

use of gunpowder and artillery. In the words of Babar, they 'taught ingenuity and mechanical invention in a number of handicraft arts,' the very nomenclature of which being made up of non-Hindu words shows their foreign origin. They introduced candles, paper, glass, and household furniture and saddlery. They improved the knowledge of the people in music, instrumental and vocal, medicine and astronomy, and their example was followed by the Hindus in the perversions of both these sciences, astrology, and alchemy. Geography and history were first made possible departments of knowledge and literature by their example. They made roads, aqueducts, canals, caravansaries, and the post office, and introduced the best specimens of architecture, and improved our gardening, and made us acquainted with a taste for new fruits and flowers. The revenue system as inaugurated by Todurmal in Akbar's time is the basis of the revenue system up to the present day. They carried on the entire commerce by sea with distant regions, and made India feel that it was a portion of the inhabited world with relations with all, and not cut off from all social intercourse. In all these respects, the civilization of the united Hindu and Muslim powers represented by the Moguls at Delhi, was a distinct advance beyond what was possible before the tenth century of the Christian era. . . . . . More lasting benefits have, however, accrued by this contact, in the higher tone it has given to the religion and thoughts of the people. . . . . . Caste, idolatry, polytheism, and gross conceptions of purity and pollution were the precise points in which the Muhammadans and the Hindus were most opposed to one another, and numerous sects sprang up opposed to these defects in the Hindu character."

And so he works to his conclusion. In the times before Aurangzib there was being effected a fusion between Muhammadans and Hindus beneficial to both. "The fusion would have been more complete but for the revival of fanaticism for which Aurangzib must be held chiefly responsible."

Mr. Ranade says nothing of the facts that the fusion was largely due to intermarriage between Hindu and Muslim, and that the policy of fusion was rather the exception than the rule, and was disliked by the majority of both Hindus and Muhammadans. But he sees that had such a fusion been completed the work of reform would be easier to-day, and he desiderates such a fusion now. In these happier days of the *Pax Britannica* he sees visions of its completion. But will it come till both sections have adopted many a reform and found a common religion?

THE last number of the *School World*, which completes the first volume of this interesting and instructive educational magazine, contains a noteworthy paper on geography as a means of education, by Mr. G. G. Chisholm, the well known university extension lecturer and writer of geographical text-books. The paper was read at a conference on the teaching of geography held under the auspices of the London School Board; and in laying his views before a meeting of teachers who had to

deal with young children Mr. Chisholm said that while he had had no experience as a teacher of the very young he had had as an examiner many opportunities of learning about the teaching of geography in schools. The diffidence that he felt on account of lack of experience of teaching was lessened, too, he also said, by the fact that he had nothing very novel to put forward. The general principles on which in his opinion the teaching of geography should be based had for a long time been approved outside England and were getting to be acted on more and more in English schools, and all that he would try to do would be to direct attention to certain corollaries from those principles which were too generally overlooked.

In the first place, then, said Mr. Chisholm, it was necessary to have a precise idea of the subject of geography. The dictionary definition of geography as "a description of the earth's surface" was too vague to be of any practical use. In ordinary school teaching the chief thing to be considered was the earth as the abode of man, and in the teaching of geography the idea of distribution of population was to be taken as a guiding principle. Geography, therefore, should concern itself with questions such as why certain regions were more densely peopled than others; what were the conditions which enabled some regions to afford room for a vast expansion of population; and why population came to be aggregated at certain points on the earth's surface. It would be absurd, however, said Mr. Chisholm, to try to present such ideas all at once to a child's mind; and the idea of distribution should be a guide for the teacher rather than for the pupil.

Assuming that this idea ought to be a guiding principle, Mr. Chisholm said the first deduction he would make was that geography was not a study which consisted chiefly in the getting by heart of proper names. This admitted, the problem arose how the teacher could get into the child's mind at the earliest stage of geographical instruction ideas about those things with which geography was concerned. Of this problem, Mr. Chisholm said, there was only one solution, and that was to take as the starting point the knowledge which the child had, or might be led to acquire from his own observation, of his own surroundings. In most parts of England, he said, a child might be taught to observe the difference between level and steep or sloping streets or roads. The child knew the difference between summer and winter and perhaps also the difference between cold and warm winds. He might even know the effect of drought or heat or cold on vegetation, and could be got to perceive the advantage of shelter from cold winds. He knew, or might easily be made to understand, that things sold in shops usually came from a distance, and if he lived in a town he knew that butter, flour, fruit, vegetables, were not produced in towns. As to how and at what stages knowledge of this kind was to be applied Mr. Chisholm said it

was unnecessary for him to make any suggestions. He laid special emphasis, however, on the importance of getting children at all stages of instruction to understand and bear in mind the difference between level and steep streets or roads. On this difference, he said, the importance of the study of the physical features of a country largely depended.

The most important corollary, said Mr. Chisholm, which he would draw from the fundamental idea as to the teaching of geography, was that no child was at a stage to learn anything of the geography of a country until his imagination was so far developed that he could be brought to entertain some broad idea, however simple, of the physical features of the country. He ought, for example, to be able to conceive that in one part of a country he might be able to go for mile after mile in any direction without having to make use of any steep roads; that in other parts he might be able to travel long distances at a height greater than that of the highest mountains in England, though he might from time to time be compelled to descend into deep narrow troughs; and that in other parts again he would have to wind out and in among mountains which everywhere rose high on either side of the road. In this connection Mr. Chisholm observed that while some teachers appreciated the fundamental importance of physical features, many had too narrow an idea of what physical features were, or what those physical features were which were most worthy of study. It was really more important to know where there were extensive elevated regions, or where there was a broad succession of mountain chains and valleys, than to know where there was a mountain chain sufficiently long and definite to have a name in a text-book. In connection with the subject of physical features Mr. Chisholm also observed that the importance of valleys as distinguished from the rivers that flowed through them was not so fully and generally appreciated as it ought to be. In many cases, he said, the valley was of much more importance as a physical feature than the river that flowed through it, even though the river was of considerable size. He called the attention of his audience to some cheap maps that were being prepared by Messrs. Dickinson and Andrews, in which the importance of physical features was adequately treated.

Continuing, Mr. Chisholm said that while geography was concerned not with names but with things, it was not enough for children to learn about those things their mere positions, even if the things were towns. All towns that were worthy of mention in school teaching owed their importance more or less to the physical features of their situations, and their positions should always be defined with reference to these features. Even if nothing could be said of a town except that it was in the middle of a great populous plain, or something similar, this

much should be clearly said about it. When mountains and valleys had to be considered, their relations to the physical features of the countries in which they were situated were more important still. In this connection Mr. Chisholm commended the *International Geography* recently published by Messrs. Newnes and Co.

Speaking of map-drawing in school, Mr. Chisholm said that children should always be taught to indicate, however roughly, the extent of high ground in a country. He also said that the outlines of the maps to be copied should be simplified to such an extent as to allow of the same map being frequently copied.

In conclusion he said that if geography were taught from the first in the manner indicated, the elementary stages of instruction would form a natural preparation for the higher stages, including the special applications of geography, such as historical geography and commercial geography. The higher stages would be largely a mere development—a widening and deepening—of the knowledge gained in the elementary stages. In illustration of this Mr. Chisholm cited a few of the questions to which answers are furnished by historical and commercial geography, and finally urged as an important aid to the study of geography in schools the use of good reading-books giving faithful but sympathetic pictures of life in different countries, and showing how much each country owed to other countries, through the triumphs of industry over nature.

SCIENTIFIC AND LITERARY JOTTINGS.

The interesting suggestion has been made by Professor Adam Sedgwick that perhaps the variability of organisms has decreased with the progress of evolution. If this be the case, a solution would be thus afforded for the difficulty that biologists have had in bringing their requirements as to the age of the earth within the limits granted by physicists. If variation was markedly greater in the early periods of the existence of living matter, it is clear that it would have been possible for evolutionary change to have been effected much more rapidly than at present. Professor Sedgwick's argument is as follows:—

"According to the Darwinian theory of evolution, one of the most important factors in determining the modification of organisms has been natural selection. Selection acts by preserving certain favourable variations, and allowing others less favourable to be killed off in the struggle for existence. It thus will come about that certain variations will be gradually eliminated. Meanwhile the variations of the selected organism will themselves be submitted to

selection, and certain of these will be in turn eliminated. In this way a group of organisms becomes more and more closely adapted to its surroundings; and unless new variations make their appearance as the old unfavourable ones are eliminated, the variability of the species will diminish as the result of selection."

The experience of breeders is that continued selection tends to produce a greater and greater purity of stock, characterised by small variability. If, then, selection tends to diminish the variability of a species, variation must have been greater in early times than it is now. In these times the rapidity of the variation would also be facilitated by the world being comparatively unoccupied by organisms, and by new places suitable for organic life being continually formed by the cooling and differentiation of the earth's surface.

In photographs of lightning flashes it has been observed that sometimes the image of the flash, instead of coming out brighter than the background, comes out darker. This phenomenon, which is called dark lightning, has been explained by Mr. Clayden. He has found that when a plate which has received an impression of a lightning flash or electric sparks is subsequently slightly fogged, either by exposing it to diffused light or by leaving the lens of the camera open, the flash on development and printing comes out darker than the background. If, however, the plate is fogged before the image of the flash is impressed, it comes out brighter than the background, as in the ordinary pictures of lightning.

This effect has been further investigated by Professor R. W. Wood of Wisconsin. He tested it with various kinds of sparks, and found that he did not always get a reversed image. After trying a number of possible explanations, it occurred to him that the time-element might enter into the problem. The light of the spark is over in about 1/50000 of a second, and it did not seem impossible that a bright light of exceedingly short duration might act differently on a platef rom a weaker light of longer duration. This was tried, and it was found that the action of an intense light on a plate for a very brief time-interval diminishes the sensitiveness of the plate to light. Why this should be the case still remains to be explained. It is, as Professor Wood remarks, a curious contrast to the fact that exposure to a dim light for a moment or two appears to increase the sensitiveness by doing the small amount of preliminary work on the molecules, which seems to be necessary before any change can be effected that will respond to the developer.

A NOTE appears in the *Philosophical Magazine* from Dr. C. G. Knott regarding the prism photometer known as Lummer and Brodhun's photometer. He states that a photometer in which exactly the same use is made of a prism was invented by Swan. The invention does not appear to have been appreciated at the time it was made, and was gradually lost sight of. About ten years ago, Lummer and Brodhun, seeking for an improvement on Bunsen's grease-spot method of comparing reflected and transmitted lights, devised their now well-known prism photometer. They appear to have done this quite independently of Swan's invention and in ignorance of it.

By the death of Mr. John Ruskin at the age of 81, Britain has lost a man who occupied an altogether unique position. *Modern Painters, The Stones of Venice, The Seven Lamps of Architecture*—to mention only these—have placed him for all time amongst the masters of English prose. But Ruskin's style—a style most fatal to imitators—captivating though it is by its melody of language and its almost overpowering richness of diction, formed in many cases but a small part of the attraction that drew men to him and his writings. For to many Ruskin was more than a mere writer of interesting books on artistic subjects; he was an inspiration, a prophet, a master. Nor is this hard to understand. His was a voice raised in a utilitarian materialistic age pleading the claims of the higher parts of man's nature, of whatever is beautiful and noble and self-sacrificing. His writings are doubtless free from the virtue, or the vice, of consistency, and he often expressed himself in language so extreme as to be almost ludicrous, but there is no mistaking his aim, and that aim was a noble one. Hence arose the power he exerted over men with generous instincts and aspirations, and when the time comes for writing the history of the latter half of the nineteenth century, Ruskin will be considered by the historian with real insight to be not merely one of its great writers but one of the most powerful influences in modifying its thought and social life.

Of all the war correspondents with the British forces in South Africa none was more distinguished than Mr. G. W. Steevens, whose death from enteric fever at Ladysmith has been telegraphed to us. Mr. Steevens, who was quite a young man, had gained for himself an almost unique place in journalism. His account of the overthrow of the Mahdi, *With Kitchener to Khartoum*, was an excellent piece of work and gained a well-deserved popularity. About a year ago he travelled through India and his impressions and experiences were recorded in a book, *In India*, which appeared only a few months ago. His articles to the *Daily*

Mail on the Dreyfus trial at Rennes, which he attended, have also been published in book form.

It is calculated that the total average annual output of books in the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Egypt, the Netherlands, Belgium, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and Switzerland is 77,250. Out of this total 11,631, or nearly a seventh, are educational and classical books. Novels come second with 7,948 volumes a year. The books on political and social economy number 7,199, and theology and sermons 5,969. Germany publishes the most books in no less than seven out of the twelve classes into which the books are divided.

It is rather a curious coincidence that two men with the same Christian name and the same surname—both somewhat uncommon—should attract attention at the same time. There are at present before the public two writers of the name of Winston Churchill. One of the young men—for they are both under thirty—is an American, a native of Portland, Maine, and is the author of *Richard Carvel*, a historical novel which has for some months been one of the most popular books in America, and which has also been widely read in Great Britian. The other, who has distinguished himself lately in South Africa by his gallantry on the occasion of his capture, and by his escape from Pretoria, is a son of the late Lord Randolph Churchill. He has also entered on the field of historical fiction, or rather of fictitious history, having written a novel called *Savrola*, which belongs to the class of novel made popular by Anthony Hope's *Prisoner of Zenda*. *Savrola* has been appearing in *Macmillan's Magazine* as a serial, and is about to be published in book form. Mr. Winston Spencer Churchill is at present acting as war correspondent to the *Morning Post*. Mr. Churchill has been more fortunate than his well-known colleague, Mr. E. F. Knight, the author of *Where Three Empires Meet* and several other entertaining books of travel. Mr. Knight has lost an arm as the result of a wound received in the fight at Belmont last November, and has had to return to England.

The 'Semitic Series' is the title of a new series of handbooks to be published by Mr. John C. Nimmo and intended to present in a compact form the more important facts in the history, religion, government, language, customs, &c., of the Babylonians, Assyrians, and allied Semitic races. The title of the first volume, which is written by Professor Sayce, is *Babylonians and Assyrians: Life and Customs (with Special Reference to the Contract Tablets and Letters)*. This volume will be

published shortly, and will be followed at regular intervals by the other volumes of the series. Each volume will be complete in itself; and the series, taken as a whole, will take account of all the most important general results of recent research. It is meant to be serviceable both to the reading public generally and to the clergy, teachers, and others having a special interest in Semitic subjects.

At a recent meeting of the Philological Society there was keen discussion over a paper on the relation between gesture and accent in speech, read by Dr. E. Reich. Some languages, said Dr. Reich, express emphasis by quantity, others by pitch, but they all supplement this by bodily emphasis, by gestures. Why do the English use less gesture than any other people? Because they do not need it, says Dr. Reich. They express strong feeling by strong stress or emphasis on the leading words of their sentences. Dr. Reich is a Hungarian, and when he began to lecture in English he naturally used gesture. As time went on, however, he found that he did not need it, the English emphasis being enough; and on this experience he bases his belief that it is the English accent or stress which renders the use of gesture unnecessary. The English nation, Dr. Reich says, expresses its emotion by acoustic rather than by bodily vigour. This opinion did not commend itself to Professor Skeat, Dr. Furnivall, and others; but Dr. Reich made a spirited reply to their criticisms, and strongly maintained that the emphatic and unique English accent accounts for the absence of gesture in English speech.

RECENT PERIODICAL LITERATURE.

The bill of fare of the *Contemporary Review* for January is of the usual kind. It begins and ends with South Africa. In the first Article—'Capitalism and Imperialism in South Africa'—Mr. J. A. Hobson gives a sketch of the political career of Mr. Rhodes, from which, he says, two facts stand out clearly;—first that he and his confederates have systematically used politics to assist their business projects; second, that in politics they have used Imperialism as a last resort. The apparent spontaneity of Imperialism is a mere illusion; its forces obey the stimulus and the direction of financial masters. The memorable saying of Sir Thomas More is still applicable in our day; "Everywhere do I perceive a certain conspiracy of rich men seeking their private advantage under the pretext of the Commonweal."

In the last Article—'The War in South Africa'—'An Officer' says we are suffering from two things—the initial fault of the Government in being behind the Boers in preparation, and the absurd dispersion of the troops which has led to paralysis everywhere. The original plan of campaign was wrong and the organisation of our forces unsuitable, considering the nature of the theatre of war and of the enemy. He calculates the losses of the Boers up to the date of writing

to have been 6,000, ours near 8,000, and points out that to them the losses are irreplaceable while ours can be made good ten times over. It is true that we have been checked; but there is no reason to adopt pessimistic views and talk of temporary checks as 'disasters'.

Mr. A. R. Carman writes in defence of the Imperial spirit and deplores the attitude taken up by the Radical Opposition with regard to the War in South Africa. He asks, "Why, in the name of the great army of wronged workers, to thousands of whom delay is death, in the name of the pitiful children of poverty whom want is maiming with every hour, in the name of all who must beat with bleeding hands against the closed doors of life until triumphant Radicalism shall open them, do our trusted leaders in this war so constantly march their columns against the mad and invincible tide of aroused patriotism?"

In reply to Mr. Robert Buchanan's attack on Rudyard Kipling in the last issue of the *Contemporary* Sir Walter Besant points out the main elements in Kipling's work that deservedly secure for him great popularity—his reality and conviction, his forcefulness and confidence in himself, his sympathetic humanity, his instinct for selection and dramatic presentation, his wonderful wealth of material, and his patriotic spirit.

Mr. Joseph Pennell's article on 'Other Things and Improvements in Bicycles' is mainly an attack on the free wheel, which he considers to be a useless and dangerous fad. He favours long cranks and high gears, and says that bicycles should be made to measure.

Miss Alice Zimmern gives an account of the steps taken to provide educated women in London with suitable dwellings; Mr. Augustine Birrell, a review—mainly quotations—of R. L. Stevenson's Letters; and the Countess Martinengo-Cesaresco, an account of the development of the cult of the infant Saviour which was begun by St. Francis of Assisi.

Professor S. R. Gardiner defends Cromwell against the charge of opportunism. Under all the changes of his government there lay one and the same principle firmly grasped, and whether that principle be for us an object of praise or blame it must be taken into account in any judgment which we think good to formulate of the main end of his work. He believed that in the condition of the country then a Free Parliament was impossible, and battled to the last for a puritan oligarchy, that body of "honest men who with the jeopardy of their lives had rescued themselves from slavery." He strove with the utmost versatility to mould his government in such a fashion as to place it above the waves of popular discontent.

The Labour Movement in the United States has aroused in many minds a feeling of great uneasiness, and fearful pictures have been drawn of what will happen when the labouring classes will become thoroughly united and thoroughly saturated with socialistic doctrines. They will, it has been said, sweep from the face of the earth not only corporations, trusts, and aggregated capital, but the whole order of industrial society as now organised. But Mr. Ambrose Paré Winston thinks that there is no reason for holding such gloomy views. From an examination of the recent history of the labour movement in America he draws the following three conclusions:—(1) The Trade Unionists of the United States have thus far shown themselves as a whole indifferent to or averse from socialism. They look to the existing order or to conditions slowly evolved from it, for the advancement of their interests. (2) They have shown the intelligence necessary to discriminate sharply between the narrower policy of State railways, &c., and the wide policy of outright socialism. (3) They have shown superiority to mere "stampeding" by appeals to sentiment and fluid impulse.

Mr. Richard Jebb gives an interesting analysis of the Canadian trade with Great Britain. The growth of that trade within recent years has been enormous. Even so late as ten years ago it seemed that the commercial prosperity of Canada depended upon the goodwill of her most

important customer, the United States, and it was believed that this could only be obtained at the price of 'Commercial Union', leading to political annexation. But all that has been changed. In 1867 30 per cent. of Canadian exports went to Great Britain, against 59 per cent. to the United States; in 1897-8 66 per cent. went to Great Britain and only 25 per cent. to the United States.

The present objects of Russian policy in Central Asia are two—a free port on the Persian Gulf and an accredited representative at Cabul. Mr. Demetrius C. Boulger expresses the opinion that as we cannot prevent Russia from coming down to some point on the Persian Gulf, however much we may delay her, it would be as well to give way gracefully now; but Russia should be told firmly that her demand with regard to Cabul cannot be granted.

'The Riddle of the Nations' on which Professor R. S. Conway writes is the *Origin of the Aryans*. The two principles on which Canon Taylor based his well-known work ten years ago have already been proved untenable. The 'cranial index' on which he based his racial classification does not now appear to afford adequate ground for any ethnological deductions; and we can no longer assume that any element which is common to a number of kindred languages was necessarily developed before they first separated.

Dr. Stalker contributes a thoughtful article on 'Our Present Knowledge of the Life of Christ'. Nothing is more characteristic of the latter end of the nineteenth century than its preoccupation with the life of Christ: yet much is obscure. Most books that have hitherto appeared deal mainly with the story of the life of Jesus Christ; but now there is a change, and study is passing on from the story of Jesus to his mind—his self-consciousness. His moral teaching, too, is being subjected to scientific handling; and this presents problems of the greatest and most perplexing kind. Probably the next development of the study of the life of Christ will take the form of the higher criticism of the gospels. The battle of faith in the gospels will have to be fought over again in the not distant future. It is of very great importance that the constructive work on the mind of Christ should be accomplished before that day comes: for the demonstration of the unity and coherence of all the main masses of Christ's thought is the best antidote to the disposition to niggle at details.

More than one-third of the *Nineteenth Century* for January is taken up with articles on the war and the questions which it suggests. The editor prefaces the first two articles with a few sentences in which he points out that "we must expand our military forces until they are able to defend from all aggression the vast inland frontiers over sea, which our navy cannot reach." And he states that the present war is convincing thoughtful men "that we are coming too near the breaking-point of our world-wide responsibilities."

The first article, written by Col. Sir George Sydenham Clarke, begins by pointing out that the growth of our empire has been largely the result of an evolution little heeded in its progress and little guided. Its development is in marked contrast with the Roman Empire, and the German and Russian Empires of to-day, where there is clear evidence of forethought and design. It may be doubted whether this statement about the haphazard growth of our empire is fully justified, but it is startling to be reminded that within the last sixteen years 2,600,000 square miles of the earth's surface have been either annexed or rendered subject to British influence. Thus within these few years our empire has had an addition of about one-third to its area. No wonder that there is in England the pride of empire, but the real pride may easily give way to a spurious one. Moltke said that one of the most probable factors in the wars of the future would be the Bourse. And that his opinion has some foundation is seen, if not in actual wars, at least in the outbursts of a spurious Imperialism which is apt to land a country in something very close to bloodshed. Our pride

of empire is spurious unless it opens our eyes to the fact that all expansion involves great responsibilities, chief among which is our responsibility to defend what we have got. And the present war has made it quite plain that our defences are not what they ought to be. Sir George Clarke, therefore, proposes the application of the Militia ballot to all able-bodied citizens without distinction.

The same course is advocated by Mr. Sidney Low, whose articles at the present time are most apposite because of their continual appeal to history. We are apt to think of 150,000 troops as an excessive number. Yet the Spaniards had about that number of men in Cuba when they were trying to keep down the rebellion there. The Austrians required 200,000 men to subdue the Bosnian mountaineers. The Americans even now have 65,000 troops in the Philippines. Recent events have shown that the British army, in its present shape, is not strong enough to garrison and police the Empire. Mr. Low is at one with Sir George Clarke in believing that some sort of compulsory service is necessary, and the model of that service he finds in Switzerland. Every male person in the Confederation is liable to military service from the ages of twenty to fifty. For the first twelve years he is in the *Elite*. During the first year of that service a man has to put in forty-five days in the infantry: and after that sixteen days every two years, till he enters the *Landwehr*, a grade in which he remains from the age of thirty-two to that of forty. Here he has only a week's training every four years. Between forty and fifty he belongs to the *Landsturm*, or final reserve, when it is enough for him to attend one long day's parade annually.

Other articles dealing with questions raised by the present war are 'The Volunteers', by Col. J. G. B. Stopford, where paid officers for the volunteers are advocated; 'Our Indian Troops', by Sir Henry Howorth, where grumbles are expressed at none of the Indian troops being sent to South Africa; 'The South African Conspiracy against British Rule', by the Rev. Dr. Wirgman, Canon of Grahamstown Cathedral, in which he makes it evident that the supremacy of the Dutch in South Africa has been for long the ideal of the Transvaalers; and 'The War Relief Funds', by the Rev. C. G. Lang, in which a national organisation for relief is suggested.

One of the most interesting articles in the number is that by Dr. St. George Mivart on 'The Continuity of Catholicism'. Dr. Mivart's contention is that great changes have come over the belief of Romanists but that these changes have taken place gradually, without authoritative official recognition, and without any disruption in the Church of Rome. In this way he considers it proved that there has been no breach of continuity in the doctrine of the Romish Church. This contention seems to us hardly justified by the way in which the point is argued. The Romish Church indulges in nothing if not in official pronouncements, and if there is no official recognition of the positions which Dr. Mivart says most educated Romanists are now willing to take up, such opinions can hardly be regarded as distinctively Roman Catholic positions. The holding of them rather points to a very serious breach of continuity. Indeed, if men can hold them privately and yet not dare to profess them openly without evasion there is something much more deadly than a breach of continuity, *viz.*, a breach of truth. But altogether apart from the contention the article is most interesting because it lets us know how progressive ideas are being entertained in a Church whose official pronouncements, at least, have ever been most conservative. Dr. Mivart points out various points on which belief has altered. For instance, it is no longer held that there is no salvation outside the Church, and the toleration shown to unbelievers is remarkable compared with the instructions which used to enjoin upon the faithful Catholic the need of using the sword towards a heretic. There is a great change in the way in which the Scriptures are looked at. There is no longer any

trust in the old maxim, *Semper, ubique, et ab omnibus,* as a test of truth. "Four hundred years ago," says Dr. Mivart, "the authority of Scripture was deemed absolute as regards all kinds of knowledge. Now in spite of an apparent official maintenance of such old views in the present day, they seem to be entirely abandoned by almost all educated Catholics." What, then, are we to think of this, when the formal pronouncement of the Pope is that the Bible can contain no errors? This difficulty is got over by a subterfuge. A distinction is made between 'error' and 'untruth', whereby theologians are able to assert that statements 'utterly untrue' are 'entirely free from error'. Well may Dr. Mivart say that this distinction is more ingenious than honest. There is, besides this, according to the writer, an unwillingness among Catholics to accept the authority of the Church in the interpretation of Scripture, and a greater readiness to listen to the words of men of science as authoritative in their own sphere. Enough has been said to show that thought on most vital matters is being stimulated among the members of the Church of Rome. There is no lover of the truth and free enquiry but must rejoice at the fact. What its practical outcome is to be it is hard to tell when officialism seems to be all on the other side. Two priests who have given expression to their scientific opinions of late have been forced to recant, and Dr. Mivart himself has had one of his books placed upon the Index Expurgatorius.

Mr. Montague Crackanthorpe writes on 'Can Sentences be Standardised?'; and he suggests that the Queen's Bench Division should choose six of its own body who have the largest experience of criminal law. Each one of these would be asked to say what are the average sentences he would pronounce, apart from special circumstances, on an adult male who had been convicted of those offences which most commonly occur, and who is not entitled to the benefit of the First Offenders Act. Once these six averages have been got, let the average of these averages be taken. Let the same process be gone through where there are one or more previous convictions, and let the average of the increase of sentence attributable to that fact be ascertained in the same way. Thus we should get a table of units which would not be absolutely binding upon judges, but which would help in some way to do away with the present inequalities which exist among sentences.

Mr. Sidney Lee in his article on 'Shakespeare and the Modern Stage' pleads for a more simple representation of Shakespeare's plays on the stage. The result of the present demand for spectacular display is making the words of the play a matter of secondary importance. As some one said when looking at such a display, the words of the actors seemed simply to be a running commentary upon the scenic effects. Incidentally it is mentioned that Sir Henry Irving, who has done so much to give the spectacular part prominence, has lost on Shakespearian productions a hundred thousand pounds.

Mr. J. Cuthbert Hadden protests against 'The Tinkering of Hymns', considering that hymn-writers ought to have ordinary literary respect paid to them. Mr. Herbert Paul treats of Swift under the heading 'The Prince of Journalists'. An old ghost story of Nathaniel Hawthorne is, in this number, given for the first time to the public. Two or three other articles complete the number.

THE *Fortnightly* reflects the general interest. There are three articles on the war, Major Griffiths begins with 'The Conduct of the War', and he evidently holds a brief for the service to which he belongs. At any rate he is not willing to believe anything against the military side of the War Office, and he is willing to believe a good deal against the civil side. He is strong in his condemnation of the policy of the Government which not only would not expend a shilling on its armaments until the time of embarkation actually arrived, but even at the same time allowed the Transvaal agents to make preparations within our own territory. He considers that the economy which

Government has practised is the germ out of which so many disheartening failures have grown. Major Griffiths goes over the various engagements in detail, and exonerates the generals from blame, although he confesses that some painful points need clearing up. His contention evidently is that military men are the men to govern the War Office, and that the supremacy of a civilian in it is inadvisable. How far such a thesis is correct will doubtless be seen before long, for the country is pretty sure to demand an enquiry into the working of this 'Circumlocution Office'.

Dr. Hillier writes upon 'Issues at Stake in South Africa', and draws especial attention to the effect of the native races upon the Boer character. The Boers have never felt anything but resentment at the emancipation of their slaves. The Boers have been in contact with the natives for two hundred years, and the result has not been for their good. At the present day they look upon the Hottentot and the Kaffir very much as chattels. In former days the native was enslaved by the Boer, now he is brutally treated, and sometimes murdered, almost with impunity. The result is that the Boers have developed their slave-driving instinct to the full, and they believe that every one must bow down before them. Contact with the natives has produced not only a domineering and vainglorious character, but it has also left its traces upon the language of the Boers. There is a considerable difference between the Dutch of the Netherlands and that of South Africa. "A Dutchman of the seventeenth century, " says Dr. Hillier," would more readily understand the Boer than his Hollander kinsman of the present day." In order to convey ideas to the natives a simplicity of language was adopted which has had a most peculiar reaction upon the Boers themselves. Their language has not grown, and their moral and intellectual interests have not developed. In war and in the administration of justice the influence of the Zulu, the Bantu, the Kaffir, and the Hottentot is seen reflected. The Boer Executive recently did what it wished to do in spite of the decision of the High Court, and the Chief Justice, rather than tolerate such unwarrantable treatment, resigned. But it must not be imagined that there are no good qualities in the Boers: they have great potentialities, as is shown by the way in which they take their places in the British universities to which they go to study. Really, then, the question at issue now is whether the Boer is to be allowed to progress under an equitable Government and with every advantage of a free civilization, or whether he is to recede as he has been doing in the past. There can be no doubt what the desire of Britain in this matter is.

Professor Sully under the title of 'Philosophy and Modern Culture' gives the substance of his opening address at the beginning of last session at University College, London. Philosophy, he says, is getting pushed back from the place of prominence which it once occupied. The University of London has struck it out of the Science course altogether. Even the Scottish universities have not made it one of the compulsory subjects. Two influences are at work which may account for this change. One is the quickened influence in natural and physical science, the other is the spreading of the university extension system to a vast number of men who have not the grounding of the ordinary university student. These two influences have been at work in various ways. They have led to a greater rivalry of studies, and they have also led to the prevalence of a commercial standard by which knowledge is tested. In the midst of these important influences philosophy has had a bad time. It has been thought to be nothing but a mass of subtleties, and there is not much money likely at any time to be made out of it. But while it is hardly a money-winning acquisition it is one which the present time, far from discouraging, should do everything in its power to promote. For one thing there never was a time when knowledge required to be so much guided by true principles of

thought. Again and again we find hasty generalisations made as the result of our increase of knowledge, generalisations which tend to disparage all that is best in man. The study of philosophic principles is called for by every advance of science, for it is only by them that our knowledge can be efficiently co-ordinated. Then again what is sometimes said to be the weakness of philosophy is in reality its strength. It would not do for all sciences to be like mathematics, where, as has been said, all the evidence is on one side. Philosophy has a value all its own because it is a search, and a discussion of rival theories. Then it is a science which encourages the love of ideas and of large comprehensive views of things. And it is also a subject of study which, by its very nature, tends to develop individuality. Professor Sully puts forward a distinct claim for psychology. He calls attention to the fact that the Royal Society is finding a place in her schedule of subjects for the new investigations in psychology. Since he wrote this part of his lecture the melancholy news has gone abroad that the Royal Society intends to group all psychological investigations under physiology. Perhaps this is hardly to be wondered at when Sir Michael Foster is one of the secretaries of the Society,but it is to be hoped thatthe vigorous protest of Professor J. M. Baldwin, which is we trust only the beginning of many such protests, will result in psychology being treated as it ought to be.

A 'Suggestion as to the Origin of Gender in Language' is made by Mr. J. G. Frazer to the effect that when men used to marry wives of a tribe different from their own, one language came to be spoken by the women and another by the men. The differences between the two languages, as is shown by evidence from America and Australia, were mainly in the different inflections given to the same words by men and women respectively. And such differences of inflection may have given rise to what is called grammatical gender in language.

Dr. Mivart in this magazine, as well as in the *Nineteenth Century*, deals with questions affecting the Romish Church. Here he deals with 'Some Recent Catholic Apologists', and he finds fault with them because they give so much weight to authority. One sentence is notable as coming from a member of the Church of Rome—"God has taught us, through history, that it is not to ecclesiastical congregations, but to men of science that he has committed the elucidation of scientific questions, whether such questions are or are not treated of by Scripture, the Fathers, the Church's common teaching, or special congregations or tribunals of ecclesiastics actually summoned for the purpose."

Professor Lewis Campbell writes 'On the Growth of Tragedy in Shakespeare'. Mrs. Hannah Lynch contrasts Zola's *Fécondité* with Tolstoi's *Kreutzer Sonata*, and thinks that with all its animal morality the tone of the former is heathier than that of the latter. The other articles deal with 'Stevenson's Letters', 'Gains and Losses in the Pacific', 'Agricultural Education of Natives', and 'Paths of Glory'. Mr. Joseph Jacobs, the writer of this last article, gives it as his opinion that very few men who are distinguished in any branch of thought or action fail to receive their due meed of praise nowadays.